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Abstract 
What is income? It’s a seemingly simple question that’s surprisingly hard to answer. 
Income is the basis for assigning tax burdens, for distributing transfers, and for broader 
normative issues of inequality and justice. Yet we lack a single shared conception of income, 
and a pure, rigorous definition of income is impossible. In this Article I review the intellectual 
history of the income concept among tax and fiscal theorists to show the difficulty of the 
problem, and also to show that some important debates about what’s proper under an income 
tax can be explained instead as arguments over competing income definitions that necessarily 
incorporate policy choices. These insights are applied to more modern questions, like the role 
of tax expenditure analysis and optimal income tax theory. I also perform—for the first time 
in the literature—a close examination and comparison of 12 different income definitions used 
by the federal government for different purposes. This examination illustrates that there is 
wide range of income concepts actively in use, but that the measure of income for tax purposes 
has a prominent and growing role.  
This Article concludes that income is not a pure, external concept, but actually a 
constructed concept that necessarily embodies policy, and therefore political, goals. The 
differences between the income concepts and definitions examined here result directly from the 
policy goals of the various agencies, analysts, and scholars using those concepts. Therefore, the 
increasing reliance on the measure of income for tax purposes risks erroneously exporting 
what are essentially tax policy decisions into non-tax areas, such as transfer policy, health 
care subsidization, higher education grants and loans, and broader discussions on income 
inequality and economic justice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
What is income? Perhaps you know it when you see it, but defining 
income in a comprehensive, rigorous, and coherent way is very difficult, if not 
impossible. Economists, tax scholars, policymakers, and others have struggled 
with the income concept for well over a hundred years, with no solution in 
sight. Instead, we have many different definitions of income for different 
purposes—income definitions for taxes, transfers, measurement of national 
production, measurement of household resources, measurement of individual 
wellbeing, health care subsidies, student financial aid grants and loans, and 
more.2 Even within the Tax Code, there are several different measures of 
                                                
2 See infra Part VI.B. 
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income for different purposes.3 Each concept serves a different goal, but none 
is truly comprehensive, nor can any be.  
In this Article, I explore in depth the conceptual difficulties presented by 
the income concept. Because a truly complete and rigorous definition of 
income is impossible or unworkable, we all must make decisions about what 
our practical simplifications will be. This means that any operative definition 
of income is essentially a political choice, even when we claim to be using a 
pure definition, and any definition thus inherently incorporates normative 
views about, e.g., justice, social policy, and economics. Ultimately, “income” is 
whatever society wants it to be in order to achieve a result that the democracy 
believes to be appropriate and just. Including some items of income in 
“income” but not others means that those items become the focus of 
normative comparisons between individuals, while others are ignored.  
Income is thus a constructed idea, innately driven by policy objectives and 
pragmatic concerns. From the standpoint of taxation, that in and of itself is 
not necessarily a problem, nor is it surprising. It is of course well understood 
that most legal concepts and rules are constructed ideas that embody policy 
choices.4 The particular danger here, however, is that the increasing hegemony 
of the tax concept of income has second-order effects, because the choice of a 
tax base can also end up being a choice about a broader “index of equality.”5 
Because we can only study what we measure, income—and, as I show, largely 
a tax-driven construction of income—has become the yardstick by which we 
make normative comparisons between individuals, and by which we measure 
the effects of a broad range of policies and institutional forces. But because the 
definitions of income themselves incorporate policy decisions, we can end up 
ignoring or even entrenching the effects of those decisions, even in areas 
where they do not belong.  
To see the problem with defining income, consider the following puzzles, 
familiar to most students of basic taxation.  
Homeowners earn a return from their own homes, which ought to be 
considered income. The home produces a return just like any other asset—but 
the return is in the form of housing. If live in a home that I own, then I avoid 
having to pay rent elsewhere, and that savings is a benefit to me—a net 
accretion to my wealth. But that return goes untaxed—even though the value 
                                                
3 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 61 (gross income), 62 (adjusted gross income), 63 (taxable income) & 
55(b)(2) (alternative minimum taxable income). There are several different definitions for 
“modified adjusted gross income.” See, e.g., §§ 24(b)(1), 36B(d)(2)(b), 86(b)(2), 135(c)(4), 
221(b)(2)(C), etc.  
4 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809 (1935). 
5 See infra Part VI.A. 
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of that housing benefit would be taxed if instead I rented the home to a third 
party. 
The failure to tax imputed rental income is considered a big hole in the tax 
base. The Treasury Department treats the exclusion of net imputed rent from 
owner-occupied housing as the second-biggest tax expenditure, costing about 
$100 billion a year in lost revenue.6 
A similar problem in income taxation is the imputed income from self-
provided services, especially child care and housework. Providing child care 
oneself generates imputed income, since the parent thereby avoids paying out 
cash to a third party. As with owner-occupied rent, if the parent paid a child 
care provider to watch his kids while working him- or herself as a child care 
provider outside the home, both payments would be taxable, and the result 
shouldn’t be different just because the parent provides the care to his or her 
own children, rather than someone else’s.  
Like the non-taxation of imputed rent, the non-taxation of imputed 
services is a pervasive and important problem. It likely accounts for at least 
some of the relatively low labor-force participation by women, for example, 
since it is often cheaper after taxes for a mother to provide child care herself 
then to pay someone else to enable her to work outside the home.7 Empirical 
studies have shown that secondary earners in a household are particularly 
responsive to marginal tax rates, so this effect could be quite large.8 
But what’s often left out of these commonplace discussions is how far the 
imputed income logic can go. If I am earning imputed rent from my home, 
what about from my car? My furniture? My computer? My dishwasher? My 
dishes? And if a stay-at-home parent is earning imputed income from self-
provided child care, what about lawn-mowing? Cooking? Shaving? Or even 
providing parental advice? Each of these things is a valuable good or service 
that has or could have a market price, and the logic behind imputed rent and 
child care services applies equally to these other goods and services. And these 
are the simple problems—as I discuss below, problems of psychic and capital 
income compound the issue significantly. Once these forms of income are 
included, it’s not even clear what income is any more. 
                                                
6 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Tax Expenditures 9-10, 22 (Nov. 11, 2015), available at: 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expenditures-
FY2017.pdf.  
7 See, e.g., Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of 
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 69-71 (1971). 
8 See, e.g., Nada Eissa, Taxation and Labor Supply of Married Women: The Tax Reform Act of 
1986 as a Natural Experiment, NBER Working Paper No. 5023 (2001); Emmanuel Saez, Joel 
Slemrod, & Seth H. Giertz, The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A 
Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 3, 3-4 (2012). 
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This conceptual difficulty of defining income comprehensively is an old 
problem. The puzzles above are versions of Kleinwächter’s Conundrums, 
posed by the German fiscal theorist Friedrich von Kleinwächter in 1898 to 
attack the very idea of income taxation.9 Henry Simons (1938) is usually read 
as effectively rebutting Kleinwächter, but as I show here, Simons did not 
resolve the most difficult issues. Moreover, one of the lesser known purposes 
of Simons (1938) was to reject definitional arguments in the first place. 
Arguments over what is and isn’t “income” elevate accounting operations, he 
wrote, and can make us lose sight of the fact that an income tax is ultimately a 
tax on individuals according to their economic wellbeing.10  
Early courts also struggled with defining income, and it was not until 1955 
that the Supreme Court held that the 16th Amendment authorized taxing a 
broad and expansive concept of income from “whatever source derived.”11 
One of first early debates in the courts was over the treatment of stock 
dividends in the Eisner v. Macomber case, a question that appeared to divide 
Henry Simons and another early–20th century economist, Edwin R.A. 
Seligman. Simons viciously attacks Seligman’s argument that stock dividends 
cannot be income under the Constitution, but ultimately reaches the same 
conclusion on pragmatic grounds. In a sense, Simons ignores his own advice 
and is seduced by the definitional argument, while dismissing its usefulness at 
the same time.  
This same issue—disguising policy choices as something more normative 
or theoretical—pervades two other prominent debates in the literature: over 
the roles of a “comprehensive tax base”12 and of tax expenditures.13 Boris 
Bittker appears in both debates, making strong arguments against reliance on 
some “pure” definition of income, but the errors he points out still linger, as 
evidenced by the Joint Committee on Taxation’s failed 2008 project to reform 
tax expenditures analysis.14 These debates underscore further that income is 
constructed concept, as are the purported normative baselines to which we 
compare our actual tax base. 
Income definition issues also arise in interpreting optimal tax theory, 
because economists working in the Mirrlees (1971) framework have adopted a 
particular, and narrow, definition of income different from that used by other 
economists and legal scholars for other purposes. The Haig-Simons definition 
continues to be the broadly accepted comprehensive statement of income 
                                                
9 See infra Part II.A. 
10 See infra Part II.B. 
11 I.R.C. § 61(a); Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1955). 
12 See infra Part III. 
13 See infra Part IV. 
14 See infra Part IV.B. 
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(even if, as I show, it has several problems), but it is quite different from the 
optimal tax theory definition, which usually starts from the idea of just labor 
income—a person’s wage rate times work effort.  
In the Mirrlees (1971) framework, the social planner is often described as 
wanting to tax ability to earn income, rather than income itself, since that 
would avoid the distortion from taxpayers substituting leisure for labor. But 
because the social planner can only observe and tax actual income, information 
asymmetries arise that can lead to labor/leisure distortions and deadweight 
loss. Optimal income tax theory asks how to maximize social welfare given 
these forces, and the models suggest how to “optimally” tax income—most 
famously, the Atkinson & Stiglitz (1976) result, which is sometimes interpreted 
to mean that the social planner should not tax capital income at all.  
But optimal income tax theory is not free from the same definitional 
ambiguities that bedeviled early legal scholarship. The definition of income in 
optimal tax theory—generally labor earnings that are a function of ability and 
effort—is quite different from both the definition used by other theorists and 
the actual definition in the Tax Code. And that choice of definition is driven 
by the particular policy concerns of the researchers—namely minimizing 
labor/leisure distortions and the need for a mathematically tractable way to 
model the social planner’s information problems. The results that flow from 
the models depend on large part on these prior decisions about how to define 
income. Different definitions could produce different results, however. Thus a 
measure of caution is needed in interpreting the results of the theory.  
To underscore the point that there is no single definition of income, and 
that even practical definitions can differ greatly, I also analyze and compare a 
dozen different income concepts used by government agencies for various 
purposes, such as economic analysis or distribution of transfers.15 The depth 
and breadth of this comparison is, to my knowledge, unique in the literature, 
and it reveals a surprising amount of variation, as well as a surprising amount 
of uncertainty—the definitions of income are relatively opaque, especially in 
the details. Despite this variation, however, the definitions also show a core 
connection to adjusted gross income, or “AGI,” the tax measure of income. 
Several of the income definitions are just modifications to AGI, others are 
surveys that refer to tax returns, and others rely in part on tax administrative 
data in constructing their measures. The tax system’s choices of how to 
measure income thus reverberate into other non-tax areas, meaning that tax 
policy choices can inadvertently affect non-tax policies. 
I conclude by examining some of the leading economic studies of income 
inequality, especially by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez. Piketty & Saez 
                                                
15 See infra Part VI.B. 
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(2003) relies on tax administrative data to measure income inequality, in order 
to measure top income shares where survey data is lacking. But I show that 
this choice raises significant questions about the way they measure both levels 
of income and income shares. These issues are implicitly acknowledged by 
Piketty, Saez & Zucman (2016), which leans more heavily on survey data, 
especially from the Census Bureau, to get a fuller picture of income 
distribution. The need to rely on multiple sets of data is further reinforced by a 
competing line of income inequality literature, especially Burkhauser, 
Larrimore et al. (2012) and Larrimore, Burkhauser et al. (2016).   
This Article makes several contributions. First, it provides a critical 
examination of the intellectual history of the income concept, spanning from 
1898 to the present day, and incorporating materials from the legal, economic, 
and policy literatures. While necessarily incomplete, it is still the most 
comprehensive overview in the literature to date, and yields several important 
insights. Second, this Article provides a close reading of the optimal tax theory 
literature to challenge some of the overly-simplistic ways that it is sometimes 
interpreted, especially in the legal literature. Third, it provides a uniquely broad 
and deep examination of 12 different income concepts used by the federal 
government, and the pros and cons of each. This is a material that is necessary 
for any analysis of income data, yet has not appeared in the literature prior to 
now. Finally, the Article shows the growing hegemony of the tax concept of 
income—AGI—and describes the risks (and some rewards) of applying that 
concept outside of tax.  
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I critically review some of the 
early intellectual history of the income concept, especially the role of Henry 
Simons and his famous statement defining income. Part III examines and 
recasts the prominent mid-century debate over the comprehensive tax base. In 
Part IV, I do the same for the tax expenditure debate, highlighting especially 
the failure of the Joint Committee’s 2008 reform project. Part V turns to 
optimal income tax theory, to explain how policy choices embedded in the 
optimal tax models influence the interpretation of the models. Part VI expands 
beyond income taxation to examine other income definitions and concepts, 
but also shows the long reach of the tax definition of income. This Part also 
reviews the work of Piketty, Saez, and others. Part VII concludes. 
II. THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING INCOME 
The problems with defining income are as old as—if not older than—the 
income tax itself. In this Part, I review some of the early intellectual history of 
the income concept, focusing on the work of Friedrich von Kleinwächter, 
Edwin R.A. Seligman, and Henry Simons. Henry Simons is sometimes 
portrayed as resolving important definitional questions, but, as I show here, all 
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he does is either dismiss them or rephrase them. The same questions remain 
with us today. 
A. Kleinwächter’s Conundrums and the Problem of Imputed Income 
The challenge that imputed and psychic income pose to a rigorous 
conception of income has been known since at least the 19th century. The mid- 
to late-19th century was the beginning of the widespread shift from property 
taxes and customs duties to income taxes as the biggest source of government 
revenue, and early fiscal theorists, especially in Germany, struggled to come up 
with a clear definition of this new tax base.16 A particular example of the 
difficulty that has played an important role in English-language tax theory are 
what are sometimes called “Kleinwächter’s Conundrums,” discussed by 
Simons (1938).17 Because Kleinwächter’s criticisms continue to be trenchant 
over 100 years later, and because the Haig-Simons income definition is a direct 
response to them, I review them here in detail. 
Kleinwächter (1898) presents the straightforward logic for why “income” 
must include items of imputed or psychic income. He starts by saying that 
income clearly cannot be just cash income, since one could also be enriched by 
commodities and other non-cash property and benefits, such as room and 
board for a household servant.18 And, if that is so, then “income” must also 
include intangible items, like property or contract rights. And if these 
commodities and rights received externally can be income, so must 
commodities and rights produced within a household, like a farmer growing 
his own food.19  
                                                
16 See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME 
AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 59-80 (1938) (reviewing earlier attempts). 
17 Id. at 52-53. 
18 FRIEDRICH LUDWIG VON KLEINWÄCHTER, DAS EINKOMMEN UND SEINE 
VERTEILUNG (INCOME AND ITS DISTRIBUTION) (1898) (unpublished trans. Hannelore T. 
McDowell, on file with the Wake Forest University Law School Library), 3 (“Actually, as far as 
the concept of income is concerned, it is of no importance whether the individual receives 
cash in hand with which he will buy the necessary food items, the clothing and other things 
which are needed in life; or if all these items in question are delivered to his house in kind, 
because in both cases some kind of goods came into his household from the outside.”) (All 
Kleinwächter page references are to the McDowell translation.) 
19 Id. at 5 (“[I]f, for example, a landowner rented his land for monetary rent and lived on 
this rent in a city far away from his estate there could be no doubt, even by the limited 
conception [of monetary income], that that man had a regular income. Now, compare this 
landowner with a second one, who does not rent his properties, but rather cultivates them 
himself and perhaps consumes the major part of the harvest of his estate directly. One is 
forced to conclude, that this second property owner also, as well as the first one, has an actual 
‘income.’”). 
THE DEFINITIONS OF INCOME - DRAFT 
 9 
At this point, once income includes tangible and intangible goods, and 
goods produced both outside and within a household, Kleinwächter declares, 
“one has reached a point where the concept of income has become so watery 
and ethereal that absolutely nothing can be done with it in practical life.”20 He 
then proceeds with his famous Flügeladjutent example.  
Suppose, he says, that there is a soldier who serves as the prince’s 
Flügeladjutent, or aide-de-camp: 
The aide-de-camp occupies an apartment in the princely residence which 
obviously is free of charge; heating and lighting, understandably, are also 
free; one or two servants are assigned to the aide-de-camp from the 
princely household; he takes his meals daily at the princely table; every 
evening he sits in the box at the theater with his sovereign; he rides in the 
carriage and rides on the horses of his master; he accompanies the ruler on 
all excursions and trips and takes part in all festivities at court. In short, he 
leads a life as if he himself were a prince, at the cost of the princely 
bureaucracy.21 
Clearly, says Kleinwächter, this soldier has income to the extent of these 
benefits, much more so than if he were just assigned a normal post where he 
would receive little more than his wages. While this is an extreme example, he 
goes on, the same logic would apply to any job that includes payment or 
benefits in kind, such as a servant’s room and board or a private teacher’s 
standing invitation to lunch (this being 1898).22 
Treasting in-kind transfers as income raises difficult issues of identifying 
and valuing the various benefits a person might receive, but Kleinwächter goes 
further. First, he asks, what if the aide-de-camp actually hates all of these 
things? How should we consider these benefits “if the continuing visits to the 
theater, concerts, balls, evening parties (and so on) are a great bore; in short, if 
all of this is an exceedingly burdensome official duty to him?”23 How do we 
value perquisites that are not benefits but rather burdens of the job, 
particularly when such benefits and burdens are subjective? 
Second, he asks, if all the goods and services that come into a household 
are income, what about a meal at a friend’s house, or even “an offered cigar”?24 
Would not these too be accretions to wealth, or a flow of benefits? Finally—
anticipating that “sharing economy” that will appear over a century later—
Kleinwächter wonders about under-used consumer durables and personal 
                                                
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 6. 
22 Id. at 7-8. 
23 Id. at 8. 
24 Id. at 9. 
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time. If one who stays in his home instead of renting it out has imputed rental 
income, what about someone who chooses to lie on his own “bed or divan 
and perhaps read the most dreadful dime novels”?25 Or a mother who chooses 
to wash and comb “her little wild rascals” rather than earn cash by washing 
and combing another’s?26 And so on. 
Kleinwächter underscores the absurdity of going to these extremes by 
illustrating the distributional consequences. A poor family would suddenly 
seem rich, because of all the services they provide to themselves, unable to 
afford alternatives: 
[I]f then in addition, the heavens are as merciful as to send a few long and 
hard illnesses into their home, during which time the children are being 
nursed by the mother with self-sacrifice of her own health, and if—which 
is the main point—the people do not forget to register painstakingly all of 
those services in their ledger as receipts because every service could have 
been performed for strangers for money or, the reverse, would have had to 
be bought for money from strangers—thus, the ledger will easily show a 
sum of “receipts” of several tens of thousands at the end of the year.27 
In summary, Kleinwächter makes three essential arguments against the 
income concept. First, it is impossible to identify all the “inflows of 
satisfactions” (in Edwin Seligman’s later phrase) that a person accrues. Second, 
even if we could identify these flows of satisfactions, the measurement of such 
income is not feasible, since the satisfactions are subjective and heterogeneous. 
Third, if we actually solved the first and second problems, income would not 
serve well as an “index of equality” (in Richard Musgrave’s later phrase) for 
making comparisons between households.  
Ultimately, Kleinwächter concludes, income tax supporters have “let 
themselves be deceived by the transactions of the businessman.”28 Business 
income, he says, is an accounting shorthand to measure profit and loss, but 
cannot be pressed into the broader measurement of all individuals’ inflows and 
outflows, particularly of intangible or self-created goods, much less the psychic 
benefits of each. As Henry Simons, writing 40 years later, says, “[t]he problem 
is clearly hopeless.”29  
                                                
25 Id. at 9-10. 
26 Id. at 10. 
27 Id. at 10-11. 
28 Id. at 19. 
29 SIMONS, supra note 16, at 53. 
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B. Simons’s (Partial) Solution 
Despite his pronouncement of the problem as hopeless, Henry Simons 
takes up the challenge of defining income, or at least appears to. His phrasing 
of the definition has become canonical among tax theorists, lawyers, and 
economists, but his treatment of the problem is more nuanced and, at times, 
contradictory. Simons defines income as follows: 
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market 
value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of 
the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period 
in question. In other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding 
consumption during the period to “wealth” at the end of the period and 
then subtracting “wealth” at the beginning.30 
He goes on to say that the “sine qua non of income is gain.”31 Here, Simons’s 
main task is rebutting those who would define income as merely an accounting 
measure of the differences between inflows and outflows.32 Simons rightly 
deserves credit for putting to rest that idea, and especially with acknowledging 
that increases in wealth are just as much income as wages or the profit from 
sales. But, as he himself acknowledges, his phrasing does not answer “the 
unanswerable question as to where or how a line may be drawn between what 
is and what is not economic activity.”33 
He then turns to some of the objections raised by Kleinwächter. As to 
imputed income, including self-provided services like caring for sick children, 
Simons largely assumes away the problem. First, he notes (correctly) that 
“leisure is itself a major item of consumption,”34 and that therefore we don’t 
need to be concerned with identifying non-market services. Whether one 
provides a service within the household or just sits around, one would be 
consuming the same amount, in terms of an hourly wage forgone.35 Second, he 
assumes that “these elements of income vary with considerable regularity, 
from one income class to the next, along the income scale.” Because, Simons 
                                                
30 Id. at 50. This is typically called “Haig-Simons” income, because of the similar 
formulation of Robert Murray Haig. See Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income, in THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig, ed., 1921) (“Income is the money value of 
the net accretion to one’s economic power between two points of time.”). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 51 (“The position, if tenable, must suggest the folly of describing income as a flow 
and, more emphatically, of regarding it as a quantity of goods, services, receipts, fruits, etc.”). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 52. 
35 That is, if we value a person’s time by his or her market wage, the imputed income 
from providing household services or from leisure (as an item of consumption) is the same—
simply the hourly wage multiplied by the time spent at the activity. 
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says, income is fundamentally a relative concept,36 we can assume away those 
things that would not alter the relative ranking of individuals. 
But this move raises more questions than it answers. His argument 
essentially is (1) that leisure and imputed income can be valued at the same 
hourly rate as one’s paid employment, and (2) that individuals’ hours worked 
either increase as one goes up the income scale, or at least decrease slower 
than the hourly wage increases. As a result, we can remove the hours spent in 
leisure or providing services in the household without changing the ranking of 
income groups.  
As to point (1), the inclusion of all hours, regardless of whether spent at 
work, leisure, or otherwise, is another way of saying that we should be 
assigning burdens based on someone’s hourly wage rate,37 not their overall 
level of income—work effort and other factors that go into determining total 
wages aren’t relevant (or at least not relevant in making comparisons). This 
presages the move by optimal tax theory to focus on “ability” to earn income, 
rather than actual income. As I discuss in Part V, this is a normatively flawed 
basis for taxation. But it also undermines the whole income concept if the 
logic ultimately leads one to throw out “income” altogether and just look at 
ability or the value of one’s time. Simons is not saying that Kleinwächter is 
wrong to consider imputed and psychic income—indeed, he essentially 
concedes the point, but just decides it doesn’t matter. But by doing so he 
implicitly redefines income itself.   
As to point (2), even if the general statement seems broadly true with 
respect to income groups—with relatively few hours in a day, it seems unlikely 
that the inclusion of a few more hours of imputed income and leisure would 
overwhelm differences in wages—it ignores several important margins of 
comparison, especially within income groups. What about an unemployed or 
under-employed person who does not actually value their leisure time? What 
about the well-known distortions resulting from the exclusion of imputed child 
care services?38 What about just the simple comparison between two 
individuals with the same wages but who work very different hours? Should an 
                                                
36 Id. at 49 (“[Personal income’s] measurement implies estimating the relative results of 
individual economic activity during a period of time.”). See also id. at 200.  
37 In addition to my objections below, it is also not clear that this would be the right way 
to value these services or psychic benefits. Researchers use many different methods to try to 
value unpaid domestic services, and using the opportunity cost of the person providing the 
services is only one such way. Other ways include measuring the market value of the output 
itself (e.g., child care) and valuing the labor based on the wages paid for similar work. See, e.g., 
U.N. ECON. COMM. FOR EUR., CANBERRA GROUP HANDBOOK ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
STATISTICs 40-41 (2d. ed. 2011) [hereinafter CANBERRA GROUP HANDBOOK]. 
38 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
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income concept necessarily assume away the differences in those two 
individuals?  
Moreover, ignoring non-market activities of households may give a false 
impression of the income dynamics of a given household. For example, if a 
household member shifts from providing non-market services to providing 
market services, the household might appear to have increased its income, 
when there has been no real change in economic power. In part for this 
reason, the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress recommended expanding 
government income measures to include non-market activity.39  
 With respect to the unhappy Flügeladjutant and the problem of psychic 
income, Simons makes a similar move as for imputed income: “again, these 
elements of unmeasurable psychic income may be presumed to vary in a 
somewhat continuous manner along the income scale.”40 But that move comes 
only after first underscoring Kleinwächter’s point. The Flügeladjutant parable 
provides a stark example of the need to value perquisites of employment, but 
the problem is not limited to members of a prince’s court. Why not also the 
“prestige and social distinction of a (German) university professor?” asks 
Simons.41 Attempting to measure the subjective value of different forms of 
compensation, Simons says, “would be the negation of measurement.”42 
Simons is again agreeing with the point—both that these psychic benefits are 
income and that they are impossible to measure—but argues again that they 
can be ignored because they won’t affect the relative comparisons between 
individuals. 
Again, this assumption is not at all obvious, especially with respect to 
horizontal comparisons. A prison guard and a public interest lawyer might 
earn similar wages, but surely earn very different psychic benefits. Political 
candidates fight tooth-and-nail over relatively low-paying jobs, implying that 
the power and prestige of the position is quite valuable. And certain well-
paying “pink collar” jobs continue to have trouble attracting men likely due to 
a perceived lack of status.43 There is enough heterogeneity of psychic benefits 
across jobs and individuals to make universal assumptions unreasonable.  
To be clear, I am not saying Simons is definitely wrong, and that we must 
include these items of income. Rather, the point is that Simons does not fully 
                                                
39 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, AMARTYA SEN & JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI, REPORT OF COMMISSION 
ON THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 14 (2009). 
40 Id. at 53. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Why Men Don’t Want the Jobs Done Mostly by Women, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2017, at A3.  
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address Kleinwächter’s argument that a true comprehensive measure of 
income is unknowable or unworkable. The point that I will make throughout 
this Article is that any income definition necessarily includes choices of what 
to include and what not, and Simons’s no less. His choice to ignore much 
imputed income, leisure, psychic benefits, etc. may be entirely reasonable—but 
it is still a choice. Simons’s construction of his purportedly comprehensive 
income definition hides many of those choices. 
The irony is that, while Simons and his book are remembered largely for 
his project of providing this purported comprehensive definition of income, 
the book has another, less well-known goal as well—to advocate for less 
slavish resort to definitional arguments in the first place. He says, for example, 
that when lawyers and economists put too much stock in definitional 
arguments: 
The numerical result of accounting operations are immediately reified; the 
discussion proceeds in terms of the income tax as a tax upon income—like 
a tax on potatoes or mousetraps—and loses sight of the obvious fact that 
it is a tax upon persons according to their respective incomes which, 
strictly, are merely estimates of their relative ‘prosperity.’44 
The income tax is ultimately a tax on individuals, and “income” is merely a 
rough heuristic for what a given individual ought to pay. An income tax is 
different from, e.g., a direct sales tax or custom duty, which is just a levy based 
on the market value of a transaction. The goal with an income tax, as 
conceived by Simons and other early theorists, was not just for the 
government to get a cut of market transactions, but to attempt as best as 
possible to measure an individual’s ability to pay, and thus to determine how 
much of the overall tax burden to assign to that individual. Rather than get 
caught up in trying to define “income” is some pure Platonic sense, we should 
keep in mind the underlying goal of the tax when constructing the definition 
of the tax base—to, as Simons says, levy taxes on individuals relative to their 
prosperity.  
The implication of this view is that an operative definition of income is a 
policy choice driven by the underlying purposes of the tax, not some 
exogenous idea of what “income” is. In the end, the best rebuttal to 
Kleinwächter is that we don’t need a pure definition of income to make policy 
choices. But even as Simons makes that point, he is still purporting to provide 
a technical-sounding comprehensive definition of income involving “algebraic 
sums” and “store[s] of property rights.” As Simons acknowledges, all his 
definition does is change the question. Instead of “What is income, and how 
                                                
44 Id. at 200. 
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do we measure it?” Simons asks “What is consumption and accumulation, and 
how do we measure them?” But these problems are just as hopeless. 
C. Stock Dividends and Eisner v. Macomber  
The central tension of Simons (1938) is his robust defense of his own 
income definition and attack on others’, even while telling us not to rely on 
definitional arguments in the first place. This tension can be seen in his 
discussion of stock dividends and Eisner v. Macomber. The argument over that 
case also demonstrates another of the points of this Article: that definitional 
arguments about income are frequently arguments about something else, such 
as practical feasibility, fairness, distribution, or economic efficiency, and that 
the definitions themselves generally follow from policy or political goals rather 
than being prior to them. 
 Simons devotes a large part of his book to a full-frontal attack on Edwin 
R.A. Seligman and his treatment of stock dividends.45 Seligman was an 
American economist and fiscal theorist in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
and is an important intellectual figure behind the adoption of a federal income 
tax in 1913.46 In 1919, the Supreme Court heard the case of Eisner v. Macomber 
on the issue of whether stock dividends could be considered “income” for tax 
purposes.47 Congress made stock dividends taxable in the 1916 Act, and the 
case challenged whether stock dividends could be considered income under 
the 16th Amendment.48 The case was argued before the Supreme Court twice, 
and in between the arguments Seligman published an article in the American 
Economic Review arguing that stock dividends are not income by definition.49 
The Article likely influenced the Court, which held that stock dividends 
were not income, adopting some of the same arguments that Seligman put 
forth.50 While excluding stock dividends was a reasonable result on its own, the 
case had ramifications beyond that limited issue, since it purported to give a 
definition of income under the Constitution that was quite narrow: “the gain 
                                                
45 A stock dividend is just what it sounds like—a distribution by a corporation to 
shareholders of stock in itself. If done pro rata, this has no net effect on shareholders, since 
the new stock would not change their relative ownership of the corporation, nor would any of 
the corporation’s assets have left corporate solution. The only real effect is to move some 
amounts from retained earnings to paid-in capital on the corporation’s balance sheet.  
46 See AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, 
POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877-1929 (2013); EDWIN R.A. 
SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1908). 
47 See Edwin R.A. Seligman, Are Stock Dividends Income?, 9 AMER. ECON. REV. 517, 517 
(1919). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Eisner v. Macomber, 20 U.S. 189, 208 (1920). 
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derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.” The case is famous 
in large part for this error; the Court relatively quickly began backing away 
from such a Constitutional limitation,51 before refuting it entirely in Glenshaw 
Glass.52 
 Seligman’s argument is clearly flawed, as Simons makes clear. Seligman 
starts off appearing to use comprehensive income definitions similar to 
Simons and Kleinwächter. He says that income is “all wealth that comes in”53 
and “any inflow of satisfactions which can be parted with for money. It may 
not be money income, but it must be capable of being transmuted into money 
income.”54 As Kleinwächter pointed out, that is hardly a useful touchstone, 
since it would include things like strawberries picked while on a walk or 
parental advice to a child.55  
Recognizing that these definitions are “too vague,”56 Seligman goes 
further. Because the question regarded stock dividends, the distinction 
between capital and the income from capital is central. Seligman sets out to 
differentiate the two based on the idea of realization and separation. If the 
income from the capital cannot be realized and separated from the underlying 
capital, he writes, it is at best “inchoate” and more likely not income at all. He 
compares the lack of separation to, for example, a plumber choosing not to 
sell his services, or a mare not yet pregnant with a foal.57 Realization and 
separation are therefore “necessary attribute[s] of income”58—i.e., part of the 
definition of income. Because a stock dividend does not involve any value 
leaving corporate solution, there is no realization and separation, and therefore 
no income, by definition. 
With this, Simons cannot abide. For several pages of his book, he 
ruthlessly takes down Seligman’s analysis.59 He describes it as, for example, “a 
parade of dogmatic assertions—put forward as necessities of logic,”60 and 
states that “[i]n [his] emphasis upon the necessity of realization, Professor 
Seligman has outdone even the accountants.”61 Simons also writes, “Certainly 
                                                
51 See, e.g., Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1940) (rejecting the Constitutional 
argument). 
52 Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1955).  
53 Seligman, supra note 47, at 517. 
54 Id. at 518. 
55 KLEINWÄCHTER, supra note 18, at 17. 
56 Seligman, supra note 47, at 517. 
57 Id. at 519-20. 
58 Id. at 520. 
59 For more on this debate, see Daniel Shaviro, The Forgotten Henry Simons, 41 FLA. ST. 
UNIV. L. REV. 1, 30 & nn. 169-71 (2013).  
60 SIMONS, supra note 16, at 87. 
61 Id. at 85. 
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the phrase ‘inchoate income’ deserves prominent place among the curiosities 
of economic terminology.”62 
While the tone is harsh, the points are fair. As Simons points out, Seligman 
is inconsistent and imprecise, and several of his moves are more assertions 
than arguments. (Seligman also has a particularly weird section involving 
forests and trees.) And he is right to be frustrated by an argument for 
excluding stock dividends on definitional grounds—as we know, it led to almost 
40 years of confusion about how broad or narrow the definition of income 
was for tax purposes.63 
One would think, therefore, that Simons took the contrary position to 
Seligman—that stock dividends should be taxable as income. But Simons later 
states in his book that the decision to exclude stock dividends from income 
was “eminently sound.”64 “[T]here is here no proper issue as to the meaning of 
income,” he writes, “only a question as to what constitutes a reasonable, 
consistent, and convenient application of the realization criterion,” a criterion 
which he thinks is likely required for administrability reasons.65 He thus 
reaches the same conclusion as Seligman and the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Eisner v. Macomber, but he incorporates a realization requirement on pragmatic, 
rather than definitional, grounds. In other words, after trashing Seligman and 
others who put forward narrow definitions of income, he ultimately comes out 
in the same place. One might wonder, therefore, why he would care so much 
about the definitional issue in the first place. 
Moreover, one can read Seligman more charitably as struggling with how 
to make sense of the distinction between income and capital, which is a 
necessity in a realization-based tax system, and for what events should 
constitute realization. Seligman and the Court in Eisner v. Macomber make the 
mistake of reading realization into the Constitution, but that does not change 
the fact that our system is based on realization, and any functional definition 
of income needs to fit within that. On this and the resulting treatment of stock 
dividends, Simons and Seligman agree, but a reader could miss that in the heat 
of Simons’s attack. Seligman’s mistake is to frame that issue as a question of 
what income is and isn’t, but the analysis he follows is actually not so different 
that Simons’s. As long as we have a realization-based system, we have to 
distinguish capital income from the capital itself, and “separation” is as good a 
basis as any. Seligman dresses his argument up as being about the definition of 
income, but it is ultimately driven by practical considerations about 
administering a realization-based system, just as it is for Simons.  
                                                
62 Id. at 87. 
63 See supra text at notes 50-52. 
64 Id. at 198. 
65 Id. at 199. 
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Finally, the question of whether “gain” must be separated from capital to 
be income is not entirely a settled question today. As I discuss in Part VI.B 
below, many major income concepts do not include capital gains and losses, as 
distinguished from dividends and interest, thus implicitly requiring 
“separation” for the income to be included, just as Seligman argued. Moreover, 
the Canberra Group, an important international commission addressing 
income measurement issues, explicitly excludes both realized and unrealized 
gains and losses from even its broadest, most conceptual measure of income (a 
measure which includes non-market household production and imputed rent). 
Echoing Seligman’s analysis, they write that “[asset] gains and losses are 
excluded from income, whether they are realized…or remain unrealized. 
Instead, they are treated as changes in net worth.”66 Simons would say that any 
gain is income, Seligman would say there is only income when that gain is 
separated from the capital, but the Canberra Group seems to say that neither is 
income. With several defensible definitions of income available, arguments 
should no longer be about fidelity to a “true” definition of income, but rather 
about which better serves underlying objectives.  
III. THE COMPREHENSIVE TAX BASE  
Definitional arguments were also a key part of the battle between Boris 
Bittker of Yale Law School and several other tax scholars in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s over the proposals to move toward a “comprehensive tax base,” or 
“CTB.” Following Simons (1938) and Glenshaw Glass, tax scholars no longer 
had any doubt that income is a broad and expansive concept, and 
commentators and policymakers began advocating for corresponding reforms 
to broaden the tax base. The CTB project also had a goal of eliminating 
preferences and other kinds of differential treatment of different items of 
income, with the hope that broadening the tax base could lead to lower, less 
distortionary tax rates. 
In the midst of this seemingly reasonable project, Boris Bittker wrote an 
article in the Harvard Law Review essentially attacking the idea that a CTB could 
be a reliable guide to tax reform:  
I have concluded that a systematic and rigorous application of the “no 
preference” or CTB approach would require many more sweeping changes 
in the existing tax structure than have been acknowledged. I also believe 
that many of these changes would be quite unacceptable, despite their 
conformity to the Haig-Simons definition, to many of those who are 
attracted, in the abstract, by the idea of a CTB. At the same time, there are 
                                                
66 CANBERRA GROUP HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at 16.  
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in my view many more ambiguities in the concept than have been 
acknowledged, and at these points it sheds less light than some of its 
supporters seem to claim.”67 
Bittker then proceeds systematically through a number of different areas, 
arguing that a CTB, or Haig-Simons, approach would require inclusion of 
items that no reformer advocates including, and that the reasons for deviating 
from that CTB are ultimately practical and political, and not based on anything 
fundamental to the income concept. Examples of items that a CTB approach 
would treat as “income” would include government benefits, like transfer 
programs and Social Security; gifts; life insurance payments; gifts and bequests; 
support and dower; imputed income; and even vicarious enjoyment.68 He also 
shows that a CTB approach provides little, if any, guidance to fundamental 
questions like the personal/business border, methods of accounting, the 
taxable unit, timing, and accounting periods.69  
Bittker’s point was not that these items should be included or not based on 
a more consistent use of a CTB definition, but rather that the definition 
cannot answer questions that are ultimately about other things, like 
administration, fairness, social policy, difficulties of valuation and 
enforcement, promoting economic growth, and so on: 
This means not that all provisions of existing law are equally good, but 
rather that we cannot avoid an examination of each one on its merits in a 
discouragingly inconclusive process that can derive no significant 
assistance from a “no preference” presumption that would at best be 
applied only on a wholly selective basis. Put another way, there are 
“preferences” and “preferences”; some are objectionable, some are 
tolerable, some are unavoidable, and some are indispensable. A truly 
“comprehensive” base, in short, would be a disaster.70 
Bittker’s article provoked (in tax scholarship terms) a furious response, 
with strongly-worded articles from important figures of tax and fiscal theory of 
the time: Richard Musgrave,71 Joseph Pechman,72 and Charles Galvin.73 Bittker 
                                                
67 Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 925, 934 (1967). 
68 Id. at 934-49.  
69 Id. at 952-80. 
70 Id. at 982. 
71 R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1967). 
72 Joseph A. Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 63 
(1967) 
73 Charles O. Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicalities of 
Tax Reform and the ABA’s CSTR, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (1968). 
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responded to these critics,74 who responded yet further.75 Musgrave’s response 
is the most trenchant, and so I review it here briefly.  
Musgrave argued that we cannot even talk about income taxation without 
some income concept or definition to look to. With that definition in mind, we 
can then make decisions about when to follow the definition and when to 
deviate from it based on issues like feasibility and equity—we should only 
deviate from the definition when the gains from taking a more feasible 
approach outweigh the equity costs of not following a purer definition:  
In concluding, I believe that Professor Bittker’s message is wrong in both 
principle and application. His principle—that matters of income definition 
should be decided on an ad hoc basis—is mistaken. A generalized income 
concept is needed as an analytical tool if an equitable income tax base is to 
be defined. In application, his position—that the income concept is useless 
because it does not solve all problems and must be moderated by 
administrative feasibility—is also in error. In most situations, the concept 
points to the equitable solution, and administratively feasible measures can 
usually be found which approximate the proper result to a fair degree.76 
In Bittker’s response, he essentially accuses Musgrave of engaging in 
exactly the sort of ad hoc judgments that Bittker advocates, and which 
Musgrave condemns:  
By sedulously qualifying almost every conclusion with such phrases as 
“ideally,” “conceptually,” and “in principle,” however, Musgrave leaves the 
door open for a quick escape in practice; and this, coupled with his silence 
on so many other specific issues, makes it hard to know how faithfully he 
would follow his Platonic, or Hegelian, ideal. One can infer from Mus- 
grave’s scanty affirmative commitments, however, that he—like other CTB 
enthusiasts—has a capacious knapsack of arguments to support a wide 
range of departures from the Haig-Simons definition.77 
He goes on to describe Musgrave’s approach as “an insistence that the 
Haig-Simons definition will keep us from getting lost in a miasma of ad hoc 
judgments, coupled with departures from that definition for ‘reasons’ that are 
no more than vague, and sometimes inconsistent, intuitions.”78 
In a later response, Galvin attempts to mediate the debate—though 
perhaps ends up conceding Bittker’s point—by analogizing to the debates 
                                                
74 Boris I. Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1032 (1968). 
75 The remaining volleys in the debate are compiled in BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., A 
COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX BASE? (1968). 
76 Musgrave, supra note 71, at 62. 
77 Bittker, supra note 74, at 1033-34. 
78 Id. at 1035. 
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between Lon Fuller and H.L.A Hart over legal positivism, saying that the CTB 
position is analogous to a “natural law” approach to jurisprudence, as opposed 
to Bittker’s more positivist approach.79 Bittker, in the concluding piece in the 
debate, responds that a natural law-like command to “Follow the Haig-Simons 
definition unless it produces adverse results” provides as little guidance as 
Aquinas’s “do good and avoid evil.”80 
For the most part, the debate was not so much about whether there is a 
single definition of income—in Bittker’s response to Musgrave, he says, “I do 
not reject the Haig-Simons definition as an ‘analytical tool’”81—but rather 
whether it should be a policy goal. All parties seem to agree that there is such a 
thing as Haig-Simons income, and furthermore that strictly following that 
definition would be a mistake—they just disagree on how they would 
characterize its usefulness. Bittker argues that a pure Haig-Simons income tax 
base would deviate so far from reasonable policy judgments that we should 
not even treat it as a guidepost, and instead just make—admittedly 
contested—judgments case-by-case and item-by-item.  
In the conclusion of his first piece, however, Bittker seems to go further 
and make an argument closer to the argument of this Article, that part of the 
problem lies in the fact that there is no single clear definition of “income” in 
the first place: 
There are many problem areas in which the search for “preferences” is 
doomed to fail because we cannot confidently say which provisions are 
“rules” and which are “exceptions.”… The central source of difficulty is 
the fact that the income tax structure cannot be discovered, but must be 
constructed; it is the final result of a multitude of debatable judgments. … 
[W]e do not begin with a consensus on the meaning of income, but with a 
myriad of arguments about what should be taxed, when, and to whom.82 
Here, Bittker’s point dovetails with mine. Ultimately, a “constructed” 
definition of income, rather than the “pure” Haig-Simons definition, is the 
only possible definition that can both achieve the goals of the tax system—to 
assign burdens fairly—and be practically workable. Furthermore, a constructed 
definition of income may be the only theoretically sound definition, since a 
pure definition—or at least one that does not collapse in on itself as 
Kleinwächter showed—remains elusive. Thus, arguments resorting to the 
Haig-Simons or any other definition of income don’t answer the question, they 
only rephrase it. As Bittker points out, even the CTB proponents support 
                                                
79 Charles O. Galvin, Epilogue to the Dialogue, in BITTKER ET AL., supra note 75, at 119. 
80 Boris I. Bittker, A Last Word, in BITTKER ET AL., supra note 75, at 126-27. 
81 Bittker, supra note 74, at 1033. 
82 Bittker, supra note 67, at 985. 
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making practical judgments about particular items based on the typical policy 
judgments of equity, efficiency, and administrability. Cloaking these judgments 
in definitional terms only serves to cut off debate in areas where it is most 
necessary. 
IV. TAX EXPENDITURES 
Where definitional arguments in tax law are perhaps most pronounced are 
in the area of tax expenditures, which are defined in law as “revenue losses 
attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special 
exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a 
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.”83 Their 
leading proponent, Stanley Surrey, described tax expenditures as “special 
provisions … not part of the structure required for the income tax itself, but 
… instead Government expenditures made through the tax system.”84 As 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Surrey pushed for the government to 
provide an accounting of tax expenditures—a tax expenditure budget—in 
order to shine a light on this form of disguised spending, and, he hoped, to 
thereby reign it in. Congress has been required to produce a tax expenditure 
budget since 1974.85 
The problem with tax expenditures, as Surrey acknowledged, is that “[t]he 
use of the phrase ‘special provisions’ clearly involves a major definitional 
question: which tax rules are special provisions and therefore tax expenditures, 
and which tax rules are just tax rules; simply part of the warp and woof of a tax 
structure?”86 This question continues to go unanswered definitively 
A. Early Debates 
Bittker—of course—had problems with Surrey’s tax expenditure 
methodology, since it requires us to “first construct an ideal or correct income 
tax structure, departures from which will be reflected as ‘tax expenditures’ in 
the National Budget.”87 He goes on to recite many of the same problems he 
had with the CTB approach—that using Haig-Simons income as a normative 
baseline for measuring “special provisions” means including many more things 
                                                
83 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 § 3(3), 2 U.S.C. § 622(3). 
84 STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES vii (1973). 
85 See supra note 83. 
86 Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison 
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706 (1970). 
87 Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX 
J. 244, 248 (1969). 
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than anyone might intend, but also provides no guidance on a host of other 
things that could be considered tax expenditures depending on the choice of 
definition.  
As a result, any tax expenditure budget must make choices about what to 
include and what not to include, and those things not included may become 
even more hidden due to their non-inclusion in a supposedly neutral accounting 
of “special provisions.88 The tax expenditure budget is thus an inherently 
political document that would receive the mantle of neutral accounting.  
For such issues, every man can create his own set of “tax expenditures,” 
but it will be no more than his collection of disparities between the income 
tax law as it is, and as he thinks it ought to be. Such compilations would be 
interesting, but I do not know how we can select one of them for inclusion 
in the National Budget.89 
Ultimately, Bittker still thinks a version of a tax expenditure budget is a 
useful thing, and that measuring those expenditures against a Haig-Simons 
definition is appropriate. But he resists giving such a budget any greater 
normative weight. Calling the tax expenditure budget a “full accounting” of 
such deviations would not only be wrong, but could mean a greater 
stigmatizing of those items that are included compared to those items that are 
not, even if items not included have a greater normative effect. For example, a 
rate reduction for a high-bracket taxpayer is not categorized as a tax 
expenditure, because we have no baseline for judging what is the normatively 
“correct” amount of tax for such a person to pay.90 A tax expenditure budget 
risks treating, e.g., the earned income tax credit as less normatively defensible 
than such a rate cut.91  
At this point William Andrews enters the debate to suggest, if not a 
resolution to the definitional question, at least a change in the question tax 
expenditure analysis should ask. He first reframes the definitional point, by 
saying that the issue is not what is and isn’t income, but rather by what 
standard should we apportion the burdens of taxation. Thus, he argues, “an 
ideal personal income tax is one in which tax burdens are accurately 
apportioned to a taxpayer’s aggregate personal consumption and accumulation 
of real goods and services and claims thereto.”92 He thus treats the Haig-
Simons definition not as a sort of accounting identity—which it is—but rather 
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91 Id. at 261. 
92 William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 
313 (1972). 
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as an independent normative basis for taxation. The ideal tax, to Andrews, is 
one that is based on personal consumption and accumulation, and “income” is 
a handy proxy for that.93 
As Andrews acknowledges, this move resolves little. All we have done is 
change the question from what is “income” to what is “consumption” and 
“accumulation.” Henry Simons didn’t claim those would be easy questions, 
however. The main purpose of his definition was not to resolve for all time 
what is and isn’t income, but rather to demonstrate that issues of source 
should be irrelevant and that accretions to wealth must be considered. But the 
shift to “consumption” and “accumulation” nonetheless still has some use to 
Andrews: 
In relation to these problems the concept of consumption is not one that 
enters into Simons’ definition of personal income with a simple, fixed, or 
predetermined meaning. It is rather a concept calling for creative 
elaboration to effectuate the practical implementation of the purposes of 
the tax… But Simons’ definition indicates the direction in which meaning 
should be elaborated and where the real problems of tax policy are to be 
found.94 
With the focus now on “consumption,” Andrews turns to the issue of 
personal deductions in the income tax, and whether some deductions are 
inherent to the structure of his ideal income tax, or whether they are 
departures that could be considered tax expenditures. He focuses in particular 
on medical expenses and charitable contributions, and argues that in many 
cases those expenditures should be not be considered “consumption.” And if 
not consumption, then the amounts spent on them should not be “income,” 
i.e., a deduction is an appropriate part of an income tax, not a “special 
provision.” 
A medical purchase is not a form of personal gratification, he argues, but is 
rather a reflection of differences in endowments for health.95 Two people may 
have the same salary, but if one also has a chronic illness, that will affect his 
ability to consume other goods and services or to accumulate wealth. Thus, the 
sick person is not “consuming” health care—he is simply trying to maintain a 
baseline of normal health. 
                                                
93 Id. at 328 (“The personal income tax is thus an indirectly measured tax on aggregate 
personal consumption and accumulation. Income transactions provide the practical basis for 
computing and collecting the tax, but aggregate personal consumption and accumulation are 
its real objects.”). 
94 Id. at 324. 
95 See id. at 331-37. 
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In the case of charitable contributions, if we assume that the donor derives 
no benefit, then charitable contributions are just passing consumption through 
the donor to the donee, and it should therefore be taxed at the donee’s rate, 
which is likely to be lower than the donor’s, if not zero.96 Disallowing the 
deduction, Andrews argues, would be equivalent to taxing the donee at the 
donor’s marginal tax rate.97 And even if the donor does derive some personal 
benefit, there are a number of reasons, Andrews argues, for still excluding 
charitable contributions from income.98  
The focus on “consumption” does not resolve all the issues, however, and 
Andrews is clear that these are still judgment calls on which reasonable people 
can differ. Simons, for example, argued that charitable contributions should not 
be deductible precisely because they should be considered “consumption” by 
the donor, the opposite conclusion from Andrews.99 Bittker, in a later article, 
underscores the problems with the “consumption” baseline, while still 
appreciating Andrews’s clarification of the problem.100 
Andrews is careful not to overstate the work that his definition does, but 
by nonetheless couching his arguments for medical expense and charitable 
contribution deductions in definitional terms, he cloaks a policy debate in 
normative language, about whether such deductions are “proper” or not. 
Andrews is still arguing from definitions, just replacing a definition of 
“income” with one for “consumption.” Perhaps that’s somewhat firmer 
ground for an argument, but it does not resolve Kleinwächter’s Conundrums, 
nor does it point us to the best policy.  
That said, Andrews’ choice of a definition is still helpful in reminding us 
that the key question should be whether a tax provision serves broader 
                                                
96 Id. at 346. 
97 This is assuming that the donor passes through the entire tax benefit. But the degree to 
which that is true depends on the price elasticity of charitable contributions, which is an 
unsettled issue.  
98 In particular, Andrews argues: that we do not tax other non-taxable redistributive 
actions, such as a businessman paying above-market wages, id. at 347; that we do not tax the 
value of services provided to charities, id. (acknowledging that this relates to overall non-
taxation of imputed income, but that taxation of gifts nonetheless would advantage providers 
of services over providers of cash); and that contributions to charities other than for services 
to the poor should be considered “common goods” whose benefits are so spread that taxation 
based on benefit is practically impossible, id. at 357 et seq. 
99 See Simons, supra note 16, at 57-58 (“If it is not more pleasant to give than to receive, 
one may still hesitate to assert that giving is not a form of consumption for the giver. The 
proposition that everyone tries to allocate his consumption expenditure among different goods 
in such manner as to equalize the utility of dollars-worth may not be highly illuminating; but 
there is no apparent reason for treating gifts as an exception.”). 
100 See Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal Expenditures,16 
J.L. & ECON. 193, 195-96 & n.7 (1973). 
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normative goals, and not whether it fits into a particular definition or not. By 
treating “income” as merely a proxy for overall well-being, and not as a 
normative baseline in its own right, we are freer to inquire whether a particular 
deduction or inclusion helps to measure well-being, and not just whether it is 
“special” or not. 
B. The Joint Committee’s 2008 Reform Project 
In the years since that first burst of tax expenditure literature, other 
commentators have worked to try to come up with a more coherent theory of 
tax expenditures, but all with only limited success. Victor Thuronyi, for 
example, has argued that instead of tax expenditures, policymakers should look 
at “substitutable tax provisions,” which are those “whose purposes a non-tax-
based federal program can achieve at least as effectively.”101 This would focus 
the analysis in particular on those tax provisions that could achieve the same 
goals outside of the Tax Code. The goal would be de-cluttering the Tax Code 
of things extraneous to it, without resort to definitional arguments about what 
is inherently part of an income tax and what is not.  
Daniel Shaviro has argued that tax expenditure analysis should not hinge 
on Surrey’s distinction between which taxes are “taxes” and which are actually 
“spending.”102 He argues instead that tax rules should be analyzed under 
Richard Musgrave’s distinction between allocative and distributional tax 
rules.103 Shaviro does not present his version of tax expenditure analysis with a 
purpose of removing a particular set of rules from the Tax Code; instead, he 
sees it as a key tool for dispassionately analyzing tax rules on their own merits. 
“There is no necessary implication that tax expenditures must be eliminated,” 
he writes, “only that we should think about them differently than the usual 
‘tax’ and ‘spending’ categories imply.”104 He then goes on to propose changes 
to the tax expenditure budget that would place it on firmer ground while 
minimizing contestable political judgments.  
David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim take a similar approach of trying to 
separate policy judgments from tax expenditure analysis.105 Instead of looking 
at the tax expenditure question from the perspective of tax policy, they argue, 
we should be looking at it from the perspective of institutional design. That is, 
the question should just be how best for the government to implement a 
                                                
101 Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1156. 
102 Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 
188 (2004). 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 221. 
105 David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 
YALE L.J. 955 (2004).  
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particular policy and which agency is best equipped to do so. They compare 
having the Internal Revenue Service run national defense and implement the 
Earned Income Tax Credit: while the first task may not be appropriate for 
reasons of institutional expertise and specialization, the second may well be, 
even though the IRS is primarily a taxing agency not a welfare agency, because 
of expertise in tasks such as income measurement.106 Like Shaviro, they argue 
that the heated definitional battles and implicit condemnation of tax 
expenditures that arise from Surrey’s approach do harm to the analytical 
usefulness that a “nonevaluative” tax expenditure budget could provide.107 
While these reframings are worthwhile and would help to place tax 
expenditure analysis on more solid theoretical ground, they are fundamentally 
different projects than one that seeks to determine what factors ought 
normatively to be the basis of taxation. Tax expenditure analysis, as Surrey 
conceived of it, is partly an act of tax gatekeeping—keep what is tax within the 
Tax Code and keeping what is not, out—but it also fundamentally normative 
and distributional, in the sense that tax expenditures go above and beyond the 
justifications for tax qua tax, and in many cases actively undermine them. None 
of these other approaches would tell us whether such spending is a good idea 
or not; they would only tell us something about the choice to do it through the 
tax system or not.  
Thus, there continues to be a theoretical vacuum around tax expenditures 
just as Bittker first diagnosed in 1969 and which Andrews attempted, with 
mixed success, to fill in 1972. We still have little other than contested political 
judgments to determine what items should, or should not, be included in 
income, and what deductions should, or should not, be allowed.  
In 2008, the Joint Committee on Taxation attempted to fill that vacuum. 
As one of the bodies charged with tax expenditure analysis, the JCT annually 
produces a tax expenditure budget, along with front matter explaining the 
approach and what it has decided to treat as tax expenditures. In Reconsidering 
Tax Expenditure Analysis, the JCT acknowledged that tax expenditure analysis 
had largely failed in its project of eliminating the use of tax expenditures by 
                                                
106 Id. at 958-59. Nussim & Weisbach says that from an institutional design perspective, 
the definition of income is irrelevant to which agency does the work. Id. at 975. This neglects 
the fact highlighted by this Article that different agencies measure income in different ways. 
See infra Part VI.B. Of course, nothing prevents one agency from using another’s definition, 
but there appears to be great temptation to turn income measurement tasks over to the IRS 
and its definition. See id.  
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Congress, and it placed some of that blame on “insufficiently rigorous 
foundations” of the analysis.108  
Tax expenditure methodology requires the JCT to specify a “normal” tax 
baseline, and then to treat as a tax expenditure any provision that deviates 
from that baseline. But, as discussed at length above, there is no pure 
“normal” tax. As the JCT staff wrote,  
the “normal” tax is largely a commonsense extension (and cleansing) of 
current tax policies, not a rigorous tax framework developed from first 
principles. As a result, the “normal” tax cannot be defended from criticism 
as a series of ultimately idiosyncratic or pragmatic choices. If tax 
expenditure analysis is to enjoy broad support, it must be seen as neutral 
and principled; unfortunately, the “normal” tax satisfies these requirements 
only in the eyes of those who already believe that the “normal” tax 
accurately captures their personal ideal of a tax system.109 
To try to place tax expenditure analysis on firmer footing, the JCT 
introduced a new methodology that, it claimed, would not rely on contested 
normative judgments about what the “normal” tax baseline should be. It thus 
defined two categories of tax expenditures, “Tax Subsidies” and “Tax-Induced 
Structural Distortions.” It defined Tax Subsidies as “a specific tax provision 
that is deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present 
tax law (not a hypothetical ‘normal’ tax), and that collects less revenue than 
does the general rule.”110 Tax-Induced Structural Distortions were “structural 
elements of the Internal Revenue Code (not deviations from any clearly 
identifiable general tax rule and thus not Tax Subsidies in our classification) 
that materially affect economic decisions in a manner that imposes substantial 
efficiency costs.”111 
That second category was needed, JCT decided, because some of what 
were commonly considered tax expenditures did not neatly fit into the newly-
defined Tax Subsidy category. Provisions such as the ability to defer U.S. 
taxation on the active income of controlled foreign corporations, for example, 
or the different tax treatment of debt and equity, could not be judged against 
some “clearly identifiable rule,” because there is no clear consensus on what 
the general rule of law is. Traditional tax expenditure analysis would just say, 
e.g., that a “normal” tax would include taxation of worldwide income, and thus 
deferral of foreign earnings would be a “special provision,” a deviation from 
                                                
108 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n [hereinafter “JCT”], Reconsidering Tax Expenditure 
Analysis (JCX-37-08) 7 (May 12, 2008). 
109 Id. at 36. 
110 Id. at 39. 
111 Id. at 41. 
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true worldwide taxation. The new JCT methodology did not say that the 
provision was “special” in the sense of deviating from the pure tax baseline, 
but rather that its existence generated a lot of tax-motivated structuring and 
planning, and thus should be eliminated in the name of evening the playing 
field and reducing tax gaming. 
The ostensible goal of JCT’s new methodology was to switch from the 
supposedly “normative” Haig-Simons baseline to a non-normative, more 
practical and real-world baseline, with a hope to sidestep the Bittker-like 
criticism about the rigor of tax expenditure analysis. That new baseline has 
been described as more like a current law reference baseline, similar to what 
the Congressional Budget Office uses in making fiscal projections or to what 
Treasury uses in its alternative tax expenditure budgets.112  
Some commentators criticized this move as simply incorporating a 
normatively worse baseline—entrenching current law rather than striving for a 
more ideal law.113 But if we accept my argument that all income definitions are 
a set of choices, the new methodology is problematic not because it accepts a 
second-best income definition, but rather because it purported to be free from 
definitional problems altogether.  
The stated goal of the new methodology was to provide “neutral and 
principled” standards by which to measure tax expenditures, without the 
fraught debates around what is “income.” But those debates are inescapable as 
long as there is some baseline used. The choice of baseline affects the number 
and magnitude of the tax expenditures, and since “tax expenditure” was 
intended to be pejorative term,114 the degree of approbation is directly related 
to the choice of baseline. JCT might have declared that the baseline was not 
intended to be a normative objective, but the tax expenditure budget still puts 
a cost—a value-laden measure—on the degree of deviation from that baseline. 
Furthermore, the new methodology may not have provided any clarity. In 
the tax expenditure budget that applied the new methodology, little changed 
from the pre-2008 tax expenditure analysis. All of the pre-2008 tax 
expenditures were still considered tax expenditures in the 2008 tax expenditure 
budget.115 They just were slotted into new categories. Indeed, while no 
provisions left the tax expenditure budget entirely, only five were moved into 
                                                
112 J. Clifton Fleming & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be Divorced from a 
Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of the “New Paradigm” and its Denouement, 30 VA. TAX. REV. 135, 
155 (2010).  
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114 See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures As We Know Them?, 92 TAX NOTES 
413, 414 (July 16, 2001); Shaviro, supra note 102, at 201 (the tax expenditure budget was 
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the new Tax-Induced Structural Distortions category; the vast majority 
retained the more quasi-normative label of “Tax Subsidy.”  
In the end, the new approach did not take. After using the new 
methodology for one tax expenditure budget, in 2008, the Joint Committee 
Staff returned to its prior methodology in 2010. The JCT staff said that the 
similarity between the new and old approach, the fact that the old approach 
was somewhat more expansive, and historical continuity convinced it to return 
to the pre-2008 approach, which it has maintained through the current 
period.116 
The 2008-era JCT staff deserves credit for at least openly acknowledging 
the theoretical limits of tax expenditure analysis. Their work was correctly 
premised on the idea that there is no such thing as an exogenous, pure, yet 
measurable, Haig-Simons income tax—that even a baseline has to be 
constructed through practical and political choices. However, the project 
ultimately failed because it attempted to sidestep those issues, to be a mere 
passive and neutral observer. But the issues are unavoidable. The tax 
expenditure budget is premised on the idea that some tax provisions have a 
“cost” to the fisc and others do not, and that cost is due to a deviation from 
some preferred baseline. Because there is no truly “pure” income baseline, the 
baseline is no less constructed than the tax base itself. The construction of that 
base is a fundamentally political question, one that analysts and scholars must 
lean into instead of avoiding.  
V. OPTIMAL INCOME TAX THEORY 
The discussion above briefly lays out some of the classic debates in the 
legal literature over the definition of income, and how the unresolvable nature 
of the question leads some commentators into theoretical dead-ends. But the 
claim of this paper is not just that the question can’t be answered rigorously, 
but also that in our attempts to construct a practical definition of income, we 
necessarily incorporate policy and normative judgments into the definition. 
This is unavoidable, but the danger is that those judgments get swallowed up 
and hidden when we simply say that such-and-such is, or is not, “income.” By 
naming the thing “income,” and giving it the special normative weight that 
“income” gets, we hide the myriad decisions that go into constructing 
“income.” This is particularly a problem when two people both talk about 
“income,” but are referring to different things. As an example, I consider here 
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the role of optimal income tax theory in tax policy, and in tax theory more 
generally. 
Optimal income tax theory is a branch of public finance economics that 
unlike many branches of economics is explicitly normative.117 The basic 
question is, what tax system will maximize social welfare, where social welfare 
is represented by some function that often incorporates normative objectives, 
such as minimizing income inequality, or insuring a minimum level of 
resources for the lowest income groups.118  
This is, obviously, a difficult question to get traction on. The insight of a 
principal founder of optimal income tax theory, James Mirrlees, was to treat 
the problem essentially as one of asymmetric information—how should the 
government pick a tax schedule to maximize social welfare without knowing a 
priori each person’s propensity to earn income and how taxation might affect 
it?119 The original Mirrlees (1971) paper is dense and mathematically formal. It 
uses a control-theoretic construct whereby individuals with identical utility 
functions but different ability types choose income and consumption bundles, 
given their abilities and some tax schedule.120 By application of the revelation 
principle, the social planner can pick the tax schedule that induces everyone to 
reveal their type—i.e., to earn actual income in the same rank order as their 
abilities to earn income.121 
In the Mirrlees set-up, as interpreted and simplified by others, ability is 
represented by a personal wage rate, w,122 while income is represented by the 
person’s wage rate times effort, or wl. In the simple case, we could think of 
that as an hourly wage rate times hours worked. All the social planner can see 
is wl, not w alone. What the social planner would like to do is find the right mix 
of revenue raised—which is then used to redistribute to meet the normative 
                                                
117 See, e.g., ROBIN BOADWAY, FROM OPTIMAL TAX THEORY TO TAX POLICY: 
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE VIEWS 1-2 (2012) (optimal tax scholars “formulate 
models of optimal tax-transfer systems based on normative principles that reflect efficiency 
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118 Though often the social welfare function is strictly utilitarian, i.e., just a summation of 
individual utilities.  
119 James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 175, 175 (1971). 
120 Formally, Mirrlees describes this as the government choosing a consumption bundle 
for the individual, since the degree of taxation determines how much income is available for 
consumption. Mirrlees, supra note 119, at 177; see also BOADWAY, supra note 117, at 12 n.6; 
LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 65 (2008). 
121 See KAPLOW, supra note 120, at 65-66 & n.20; N. Gregory Mankiw, Matthew Weinzierl 
& Danny Yagan, Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 147, 150 (2009). 
122 See, e.g., BOADWAY, supra note 117, at 60; KAPLOW, supra note 120, at 54 (“In standard 
formulations of the optimal income tax problem, individuals’ abilities are indicated by their 
given wage rate, taken to be exogenous.”). 
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goals—without causing high-ability taxpayers to mimic low-ability taxpayers in 
order to lower their tax burden. They could do this by, e.g., substituting from 
labor toward leisure, taking a lower paying job, or simply hiding income. Too 
much of that behavior means less taxable income, which means less revenue, 
which means less redistribution and therefore lower social welfare. The social 
planner picks a rate schedule to maximize social welfare giving these two 
competing forces, and specifically one that induces the individuals to reveal 
their type through their choice of income and consumption bundles.  
 The original Mirrlees paper (and those that followed) contained some 
surprising results, most notably that the optimal marginal rate schedule might 
follow an inverted U-shape and actually decline at high income levels,123 perhaps 
becoming 0% for the highest earner under some assumptions.124 The logic of 
that result, in the model, is that a government can collect more revenue, and 
thus redistribute more, if it makes mimicking a low-ability individual less 
attractive to high-ability individuals; it ought to encourage them to move up a 
tax bracket, rather than down, essentially.  
The original Mirrlees paper is very stylized, and uses a “parsimonious”125 
model that, assumes, among other things, that the only differences between 
individuals are their abilities and that individuals have identical utility functions 
that depend just on consumption and leisure. The paper is over 40 years old, 
and the optimal tax literature since then is vast and complex. It is not my 
intent here to recite the nuances and results of later, more developed work, of 
which there are many. Rather, I want to discuss how the literature defines 
“income” in a particular way that does not line up with the definitions 
discussed earlier in this paper, and how that definition derives from both the 
particular policy concerns and methodological constraints of economics. As a 
result, commentators and policymakers need to be careful about importing the 
results of the optimal income tax literature, since the “income” tax that it 
purports to study may be quite different from the “income” tax under 
discussion. 
First, and most importantly, the basic definition of income that just about 
any optimal tax paper starts with is the definition above—wl, an individual’s 
                                                
123 See BOADWAY, supra note 117, at 13; Mirrlees, supra note 119, at 202-04; Mankiw et al., 
supra note 121, at 151-55. 
124 See id. at 195; Mankiw et al., supra note 121, at 151-52; J.K. Seade, On the Shape of Optimal 
Tax Schedules, 7 J. PUB. ECON. 203 (1977). 
125 BOADWAY, supra note 117, at 13. Mirrlees clearly spells out some of his many 
assumptions at the outset. Mirrlees, supra note 119, at 175-76. He also urges caution in 
interpreting his results. Id. at 207-08. 
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wage rate times effort.126 At its most basic, that is simply a measure of cash 
labor earnings, though it would presumably also encompass fringe benefits and 
other non-cash earnings. Note how far that is from the idea of gain or 
accessions to wealth that is at the heart of the Haig-Simons definition, 
however. It doesn’t include any capital income, for example, much less the 
imputed income from housing and other consumer durables. 
There are several reasons for using this particular definition of income, 
rather than something more broad like Haig-Simons. First, the definition 
follows from the set-up and objective of the Mirrlees model—namely, that the 
social planner wants actual (labor) earnings to reflect a person’s ability to earn 
(labor) income. The social planner is trying to redistribute but does not want 
to create excessive disincentives to earn labor income—the classic labor-leisure 
distortion—such that a person’s income no longer reflects their ability. 
Because minimizing the labor-leisure margin is the particular concern and task 
for the social planner, labor income and labor effort are the objects of study. 
The income definition is thus directly related to the particular policy objective. 
Second, the social planner’s objectives in the model are driven as much or 
more by mathematical tractability as true social policy. The social planner’s 
goal in optimal income tax theory is sometimes described as an independent 
desire to tax ability. Importantly, Mirrlees did not make a tax on ability an 
independent objective; his goal was maximizing social welfare. But in the 
literature, this objective is sometimes collapsed down into a first-order desire 
to tax ability.127 Beginning especially with Aklerlof (1978)128 this led to a 
literature on “tagging,” i.e., searching for non-income based indicators of a 
person’s type.129 If a tax included tags for ability, it would lower the incentives 
for a high-ability person to mimic a low-ability person by earning less 
income—the tags would reveal this mimicry, and the social planner could still 
tax accordingly.  
                                                
126 See, e.g., BOADWAY, supra note 117, at 52, 60, etc.; KAPLOW, supra note 122, at 53-54; 
Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 122, at 57; J.A. Mirrlees, The Theory of Optimal Taxation, in 3 
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127 See, e.g., A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structures: Direct Versus Indirect 
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Programs, and Manpower Planning, 68 AMER. ECON. REV. 8 (1978). 
129 See, e.g., BOADWAY, supra note 117, at 169-74 (discussing literature); KAPLOW, supra 
note 120, at 96-103 (discussing literature); Mankiw et al., supra note 121, at 161-66. 
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But let’s be clear—while taxing “ability” may be nondistortive, it is 
normatively deeply flawed.130 No government would truly have that as a first-
best policy. It implies, for example, that high-ability Ivy League graduates 
should all be taxed as if they are law partners, hedge fund managers, TV show 
runners, or tech entrepreneurs (or at least average ones, if we include luck as a 
factor), even if they start non-profits, teach public school, or become monks.131 
And presumably vice versa, though I’ve not seen this point in the literature—a 
lucky, low-ability individual who wins the lottery would pay no more in tax 
than he would otherwise.132 
The set-up is thus driven not by a true social or normative objective, but 
rather by a need to create a simplified, mathematically tractable, version of the 
information problems faced by a government using a distortive tax instrument. 
The ability/income divide is in effect a simplified metaphor for the 
information and distortion problems of income taxes. This is not to say that 
the insights of the literature are not useful—they are extremely valuable, 
especially for isolating the theoretical effects of particular tax instruments, and 
for underscoring some key questions and assumptions that should guide tax 
design. But ultimately, optimal tax theory provides little guidance about what 
an income tax actually is or should be.  
This stylized set-up and relatively narrow definition of income can lead 
commentators to misinterpret some of the results of the literature, especially 
when imported to our more real-world income tax. Here, I highlight two 
possible ways that the literature can be misinterpreted.  
First, while the income definition used in the optimal tax literature can be 
described as labor earnings, a seemingly unambiguous measure, it is not free 
from the sort of definitional ambiguity that arose in the CTB and tax 
expenditure debates. To see this, consider the way that the literature models 
utility.  
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2002); Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229, 237 
(2011); Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145 (2006). 
131 This is sometimes described as the “high-ability beachcomber” problem. See, e.g., Stark, 
supra.  
132 An easy extension of an optimal tax model would be to allow lump-sum taxation of 
windfalls such as this, since that would be nondistortive. But that’s a different policy than 
taxing ability—that would be a policy to use lots of nondistortive tax instruments, which just 
underscores that the point is distortion and social welfare, not that taxing ability is the 
normative objective.  
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In the typical optimal tax set-up, the social welfare function is some 
weighted combination of individual utility functions, and individual utility is 
usually some function of consumption and leisure.133 Consumption is done out 
of after-tax income, while leisure is just leisure. Potential distortions arise 
because consumption is taxed while leisure is not, making leisure somewhat 
more attractive than it would be in the absence of taxation. But, as noted in 
the earlier discussion,134 leisure is a form of consumption as well, and 
encompasses more than just sitting around. “Leisure” here is just a catch-all 
category for any form of un-taxed consumption.  
Similarly, in considering the labor/leisure margin and applying the Haig-
Simons identity, leisure could be thought of as any form of un-taxed economic 
income, including capital income, black-market income, psychic income, 
imputed services, as so on. In other words, the labor/leisure choice is not 
really between working and not working, but rather between taxed forms of 
consumption and income and untaxed forms of consumption and income.  
Therefore, what is “labor” and what is “leisure” is entirely a function of 
the tax itself, and in particular the choice about how to define the tax base. 
“Labor” and “leisure” do not exist prior to policy choices about what to tax but 
actually follow from those choices. As a result, using a seemingly more clearly 
specified and limited definition of income still does not free optimal tax theory 
from the definitional problems discussed herein. Choices still need to be made, 
and many of those will be choices about how to build the model ex ante, not 
in interpreting its results ex post. If “income” in the optimal tax models 
included more of the items now considered “leisure”—like imputed services—
presumably we would see fewer or at least different distortions.  
Second, the focus on utility from consumption, and the definition of 
income as labor earnings, also leads to one of the more famous and 
controversial results of the literature, the Atkinson-Stiglitz result. Atkinson & 
Stiglitz (1976) shows, under certain strong assumptions, that when a 
government has available a non-linear income tax, it is best for any commodity 
taxes to be uniform—to have the same, rather than different, tax rates on all 
goods.135 One not very controversial implication of this result is that 
governments ought to use a single-rate VAT or sales tax, rather than, e.g., a 
                                                
133 See, e.g., KAPLOW, supra note 122, at 55; Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 127, at 59; 
Mirrlees, supra note 119, at 177. 
134 See infra Part II.A. 
135 See Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 127, at 68. 
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low or zero rate for food and a high rate for luxuries. It is better instead to 
handle any distributional issues using the income tax.136 
A more controversial interpretation, however, is that governments should 
not impose capital income taxes.137 In other words, one could interpret the 
optimal tax literature as not just passively choosing to tax only labor income 
because of the structure of the basic model, but affirmatively instructing 
governments to only tax labor income.138 Atkinson-Stiglitz is interpreted in this 
way because a tax on capital is, in some ways, an extra tax on future 
consumption relative to current consumption. Invested capital is generally 
after-labor-income-tax capital, and so a person is deciding between consuming 
that after-tax income today or investing it to earn a return to fund future 
consumption. If the person expects to earn a normal risk-adjusted market 
return, but is taxed again on that return in the form of a capital income tax, 
then her future purchasing power will be less than her current purchasing 
power in present value. In Atkinson-Stiglitz terms, this functions as differential 
taxation of two commodities—current commodity X and future commodity 
X—which their model implies is a bad idea. 
The Atkinson-Stiglitz result has had an enormous effect on tax scholarship 
and policy, and many commentators take it as at least a starting point in any 
discussion of capital income taxes. It has lead even some scholars who support 
significant redistribution to at times also support a consumption tax over an 
income tax (since the taxation of capital is the essential difference between the 
two).139 
The obvious criticism of the Atkinson-Stiglitz result is that it is built on a 
highly stylized model, with many heroic assumptions about individuals, utility, 
social welfare, and the rest. (And much of the work since 1976 involves 
relaxing these assumptions, with different results.) But even taken on its own 
                                                
136 This is sometimes referred to as a “double-distortion” issue. An income tax creates a 
distortion by taxing labor. A differential commodity tax also has that distortion (since work is 
somewhat less valuable if you’re able to consume less from an hour of work), but also 
introduces a distortion between commodities. Even if you wanted individuals who buy luxury 
items to pay more taxes, you could raise the same amount of money with less distortion using 
an income tax. 
137 See, e.g., BOADWAY, supra note 117, at 96-101 (discussing this interpretation of 
Atkinson-Stiglitz); KAPLOW, supra note 120, at 221-23 (same); Joseph Bankman & David A 
Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN L. REV. 
1413 (2005). 
138 See BOADWAY, supra note 117, at 96-97; KAPLOW, supra note 122, at 222-24; Atkinson 
& Stiglitz, supra note 127, at 69. 
139 See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 137; Edward J. McCaffery & James R. Hines 
Jr, The Last Best Hope for Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031 (2010); Daniel Shaviro, 
Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, 103 TAX NOTES 91 (2004). 
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terms, we should be careful about interpreting the result too broadly. First, the 
question is not whether capital income is income or not. Indeed, unlike in the 
Mirrlees set-up, we are now at least acknowledging that there is more to 
income than labor earnings. Rather, the question is whether and under what 
circumstances capital income can be taxed without a net loss to social welfare. 
The Atkinson-Stiglitz result is thus best thought of not as a final answer, but 
rather as “an organizing device for highlighting deviations from [the result].”140 
Moreover, because it grows out of the Mirrlees (1971) framework, the 
Atkinson-Stiglitz result is driven by the same underlying policy concerns—
maximizing social welfare that is a function of individuals’ consumption and 
leisure. If all that really matters to utility is consumption, and if individuals are 
indifferent between present and discounted future consumption, then it’s not 
that surprising that the resulting welfare-maximizing tax system would treat 
present and future consumption the same. But, again, that means we have a 
definition of income that grows out of a particular set of policy concerns, 
which is one of the main arguments of the paper—that the definitions of 
income reflect underlying policy choices rather than determine them.  
We could imagine a very different set of policy concerns. For example, 
maybe accumulation of assets provides utility separate from its ability to fund 
future consumption; or excessive concentration of wealth impedes social 
welfare for a whole set of reasons difficult to model; or we have a glut of 
savings and actually want to encourage current consumption over future 
consumption; or capital income, in a low-interest-rate environment, actually 
reflects not time-value returns but a combination of luck, market power, and 
disguised labor income, all of which Atkinson-Stiglitz would happily tax. 
Ultimately, the policy choices embodied in the model are what end up 
determining the tax base, rather than vice versa. 
To summarize, this discussion is not intended as an indictment of the 
optimal tax literature, which I think is important and valuable. Rather, the 
point is that scholars, commentators, and policymakers should understand that 
when the optimal tax literature speaks about “income” and “income taxes,” it 
may be talking about something very different from what the reader imagines. 
Moreover, those particular definitions of income embody and reflect policy 
choices that may also be different from those of the reader. We must 
remember that income—even in economics—is not pure concept, but is 
rather a constructed idea based on political and practical objectives. 
                                                
140 See BOADWAY, supra note 117, at 59. 
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VI. INCOME BEYOND TAXATION 
The discussion thus far has focused on definitions of income for tax 
purposes, and the theoretical issues they raise. In this Part, I expand the 
discussion beyond just tax by considering the role that “income” plays as a 
broader metric of comparison between individuals—for both tax and non-tax 
purposes. I begin by laying out the issues that can arise when tax-driven 
measures of income are imported to other areas. I then turn to a detailed 
analysis and breakdown of the many definitions of income that are used by 
different agencies for different purposes.  
A. The Index of Equality 
Problems with the income concept have effects beyond just tax law and 
scholarship. As Richard Musgrave argued in 1959, the choice of a tax base is 
not simply an administrative choice, but also establishes that base as an “index 
of equality,”141 a metric for making comparisons between individuals. That 
normative index is particularly important for taxation, since at its core a system 
of taxation has to make normative decisions about the relative demands it puts 
on individuals to fund public and collective goods. But that normative index 
can then seep out into other areas of law and policy.  
Income has thus become generalized as the way to make normative 
comparisons. We talk about high- and low-income individuals, income 
inequality, income disparities between men and women, between whites and 
minorities, and so on. Many studies of course also look at other metrics for 
comparison, like wealth, health, educational outcomes, etc., but income is the 
dominant comparison—despite the fact that 100 years ago theorists and courts 
weren’t even sure what income was, and as I’ve argued here any pure 
definition remains elusive. 
The corollary to using income as the index for making normative 
comparisons is that only those items included in the income definition are 
used for such comparisons, whereas items not included are not. The non-
included items might still reflect important margins of inequality, however. But 
if they aren’t in the index, those margins might be ignored. 
For example, consider the example that began this paper—net imputed 
income for owner-occupied housing. That’s a significant form of income, in a 
Haig-Simons sense—for many people, it could amount to thousands or tens of 
thousands of dollars a year. That’s enough to affect a horizontal equity 
comparison between individuals. Two people with the same salary, but one 
                                                
141 RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1959). 
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owning a home and the other paying rent (and holding all else equal), should 
not be thought of as having equal economic wellbeing. Understanding this, 
many means-tested programs include assets, not just income, in their formulas. 
But the vast majority of other definitions of income—tax and otherwise—do 
not. 
As another example, consider capital gains. As Henry Simons taught us, 
accretions to wealth ought to be considered “income” under any 
comprehensive definition. But the tax system does not measure increases or 
decreases in wealth. All that it measures are realized capital gains or business 
profits—under our realization-based tax system, increases in the value of 
property do not become taxable until they are “realized” through a sale or 
exchange. Thus, an individual who simply buys and holds could see her wealth 
grow year after year, without ever having that growth appear as “income.”142 
Furthermore, many of the other definitions of income discussed in the next 
section do not include even realized gain. 
The failure to measure unrealized gains in AGI means that the tax data 
likely understates the income of the highest-income cohort, since we observe 
only realized, but not unrealized, gains.143 This absence might be even worse in 
studies that use income definitions that do not include realized gains either, 
like the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Personal Income measure. Trying to 
accurately measure the income from capital is thus a major methodological 
problem for tax and other researchers. In many studies about income 
inequality, capital gains are simply left out altogether.144 Much of the work that 
Thomas Piketty does in Capital in the 21st Century (and in earlier work with co-
authors) is an attempt to construct some measures of capital and the income 
from capital from the relatively thin sources available, relying especially on tax 
data for the wealthiest cohort.145 His work is probably the most comprehensive 
ever done in that respect, but has still faced some strong and fair criticisms. He 
has also said that his desire to have a global wealth tax is driven as much, if not 
more, by a desire for data than about any normative benefits.146 
                                                
142 Indeed, if the person holds the property until death, none of the growth will ever be 
income to anyone, since section 1014 steps up the basis of property transferred by bequest or 
inheritance, thus wiping out any built-in gain in the property.  
143 Exacerbated by the fact that well-advised taxpayers will annually realize most or all of 
their losses. 
144 See infra Part VI.C. 
145 This is partly because other measures do not include capital gain, and partly because 
other data sources are top-coded for high income people, meaning that tax returns might be 
the only source of good data. 
146 See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, Thomas Piketty Doesn’t Hate Capitalism, He Just Wants To Fix It: 
Interview, VOX (April 24, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/4/24/5643780/who-is-thomas-
piketty#interview (“To me, one of the main purposes of the wealth tax is that it should 
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To be clear, I am not saying that any definition has necessarily failed by not 
taxing these two items of Haig-Simons income—imputed income from 
housing and unrealized capital gains. It should be clear by now that I am 
skeptical of definitional arguments. My point is rather that if they are not 
included in the definition of income, they are not used as a basis for 
comparisons between individuals, for tax and non-tax purposes. If income is 
our normative index of equality, then only those things that are “income” are 
used as a basis for comparison.  
A possible response is that what a tax system cares about, ultimately, is 
cash. Cash is what the government needs to pay its obligations, and thus we 
should tax people on their ability to pay that cash.147 (Other income 
definitions, like the Census Bureau’s Money Income concept, explicitly make 
the choice to focus on cash.148) That could do away with the problems of 
imputed income and unrealized gains, for example. A senior on a fixed income 
living in a house he owns may not be liquid enough to pay a higher tax, nor 
would a small business owner whose capital is all tied up in the business.  
These are, essentially, the practical judgments we have already made with 
respect to imputed rent and unrealized gains. But we should remember that 
the tax system makes many huge deviations from a notion of cash income 
already. To list just a few: accrual accounting, cost recovery, pass-through 
taxation for partnerships and S corporations, constructive sales rules, the tax 
treatment of borrowing, original issue discount, constructive receipt of 
deferred compensation, passive loss limitations, casualty loss limitations, 
section 475 mark-to-market treatment, subpart F, and so on. In these and 
other areas, Congress has decided that a taxpayer should pay taxes based on a 
broader idea of economic income than simply available cash.  
If taxable income were just cash income, we might be less inclined to give 
greater normative weight to AGI—it would be more obviously just an 
accounting category. But because the tax system purports to measure “all 
income from whatever source derived,” AGI takes on the appearance of 
                                                                                                                       
produce more information on wealth. I think even a wealth tax with a minimal tax rate would 
be a way toward more financial transparency. A minimal registration tax on assets, a minimum 
wealth tax is a way that we can produce more information on wealth, and then we'll see what 
happens in terms of tax rate.”).  
147 See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Deconstructing the Haig-Simons Income Tax and Reconstructing It as 
Objective Ability-to-Pay “Cash Income” Tax, FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 
633, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2245818. Dodge’s “cash income” concept is 
much more nuanced than can be given justice here, though he proposes changes that move 
the income concept more toward cash, such as repealing accrual accounting and depreciation, 
and embedding the realization principle. 
148 See infra Part VI.B.2. 
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comprehensiveness, which in turn makes it appear appropriate for non-tax 
comparisons as well. 
As discussed in the next section, the tax definition of income is not the 
only one. Other agencies use surveys or other administrative data to come up 
with their own measures of income. While these definitions do not necessarily 
replicate the choices of the tax system, they make their own choices for their 
own particular policy or other reasons. I discuss these more below. But the tax 
definition of income is still the central concept. The other measures all rely on 
tax administrative data to some extent, and several of them are explicitly keyed 
off of AGI. These measures start with income as reported on tax returns, and 
then make adjustments to better capture whatever the particular agency 
decides should be included. AGI thus has a long arm. As result, legislative 
changes to the Tax Code for tax reasons can have repercussions beyond just 
tax, affecting income measures used for transfers or for other policy analysis. 
For example, moving an itemized deduction, such as for charitable 
contributions, “above the line” (i.e., used in calculating AGI) could affect an 
individual’s eligibility for subsidized health care or student loans. 
Musgrave’s prediction has thus come true, in two ways. First, income has 
become the dominant metric by which to make comparisons among 
individuals—it is the primary “index of equality.” One cannot prove the 
counterfactual, of course, but if the tax system had chosen a different measure 
of ability to pay—consumption or wealth, for example—we might have a 
different normative language today. 
Second, although income does not have a single definition, and can in fact 
be defined in a nearly infinite number of ways, the tax system’s definition of 
income—a definition driven almost entirely by tax policy—extends into non-
tax areas, and especially into other normative spaces, like eligibility for 
transfers and broader measurement of inequality. As argued above, any 
definition of income is a policy choice, but the tax system’s dominance in 
income measurement means that some tax policy choices are imported into 
other areas where they may not belong. 
B. The Many Definitions of Income 
The Internal Revenue Service is not the only agency that attempts to 
measure income. Many other agencies have their own reasons for caring about 
income, either in order to distribute transfers or to judge the effects of other 
policies. And because each agency has slightly different goals, the income 
concepts that they use are constructed in different ways, and none match up 
precisely. Here, I consider 12 other income concepts beyond Haig-Simons and 
AGI. I discuss each of them briefly below, and the differences between them 
are summarized in Table 1. But some broader points are worth emphasizing: 
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First, I am not aware of another study or paper that performs this 
complete of a comparison across income concepts. While several analysts and 
academics have made bilateral comparisons, and some cover more than two 
concepts,149 this broad and nearly all-encompassing review has thus far not 
appeared in the literature. That alone is surprising.  
Second, compiling this information involved digging rather deep into some 
agencies’ documentation (including, in the case of the Fed’s Survey of 
Consumer Finances, the ASCII-text guide for how data analysts should code 
answers to some survey follow-up questions). Much of the easily accessible 
information is incomplete or only in summary form, and it seems likely that 
few beyond those most intimate with the data fully understand what is actually 
included in particular definitions. These first two points underscore one of the 
arguments of this paper, that the word “income” is used to describe many 
things, but that speakers are often not aware of how much one person’s or 
agency’s definition differs from another’s. As this section and the table shows, 
the differences can be stark. 
Third, the particular choices about what to include in “income” and what 
to exclude are generally driven by either the policy goals or the object of study 
of the agency in question. The decisions are (mostly) not arbitrary. What an 
agency names as “income” are those items that it cares about in meeting its 
policy or analytical goals. But there are nonetheless some idiosyncratic choices, 
especially when a definition relies on the tax definition as a starting point, as 
several do.  
Fourth, there are some notable patterns. Among the items that appear in 
every one of the income concepts are wages, business income, income from 
property (other than realized gains), and taxable interest and dividends. The 
core of each definition thus contains the major items of labor and production 
that lead to cash in the hands of individuals. These are the items that would 
make up anyone’s intuitive definition of income. More interesting is the 
general absence of some other items. Realized gain, for example, appears in 
relatively few of the concepts, and even fewer of the concepts that don’t use 
                                                
149 Some examples include: Dennis Fixler & David S. Johnson, Accounting for the 
Distribution of Income in the US National Accounts, in MEASURING ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY 
AND PROGRESS, DALE W. JORGENSON, J. STEVEN LANDEFELD, & PAUL SCHREYER, EDS., 213 
(2014); Eric L. Henry & Charles D. Day, A Comparison of Income Concepts: IRS Statistics of Income, 
Census Current Population Survey, and BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey, in SPECIAL STUDIES IN 
FEDERAL TAX STATISTICS, JANET MCCUBBIN, ED., 149-57 (2005); Barry Johnson & Kevin 
Moore, Differences in Income Estimates Derived from Survey and Tax Data, SOI Working Paper 
(2008); Mark Ledbetter, Comparison of BEA Estimates of Personal Income and IRS 
Estimates of Adjusted Gross Income, 87 Survey of Current Bus. 35 (2007); John Ruser, 
Adrienne Pilot, & Charles Nelson, Alternative Measures of Income: BEA Personal Income, CPS 
Money Income, and Beyond, Working Paper (2004). 
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AGI as a starting point. The logic seems to be that transforming an asset into 
cash does not create income, just changes the form of a resource. But none of 
the concepts (other than Haig-Simons income) includes unrealized gain. Which 
means that appreciation in asset values often goes unmeasured entirely. 
Analysts and policymakers using these concepts should be aware that they may 
be inadvertently embedding these choices and problems in their studies and 
policies. 
Finally, as noted in the last section, several of these measures are at least 
partly based off of AGI, the measure of income for tax purposes. The Census 
Bureau and BLS measures of income rely on independent surveys and other 
data, with some supplementary information from tax and administrative 
sources. But the CBO uses a combination of tax and Census Bureau data, and 
the BEA uses primarily administrative data, such as tax data, unemployment 
filings, and Social Security data, as well as reliance on the Census and other 
surveys.150 The Fed’s Survey of Consumer Finances explicitly tells respondents 
to look at their tax returns to answer survey questions. And the FAFSA and 
ACA definitions start with AGI and then make some adjustments. The 
centrality of income measurement to tax administration, and the enormous 
amounts of data collected by the IRS, make reliance on tax measures of 
income extremely tempting. 
1. NIPA Personal Income 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis, through its National Income and 
Product Accounts, attempts to measure the production of the entire 
household sector (in addition to other sectors).151 The BEA’s primary task is 
calculating GDP, and thus the income concept is particularly focused on 
production, whether or not that production translates into cash on hand.152 
Thus NIPA Personal Income includes items such as employer contributions to 
health care and retirement insurance, as well as all in-kind and cash 
government transfers, but does not include most interpersonal transfers, such 
as alimony and child support.153 
Importantly, NIPA Personal Income is the only agency definition (other 
than the Census’s alternative Definition 15) that includes imputed rent on 
owner-occupied housing and the only one that includes imputed investment 
                                                
150 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, State Personal Income and Employment: Concepts, Data 
Sources, and Statistical Methods, 1-9 – 1-10 (2015). 
151 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Handbook: Concepts and Methods of the U.S. 
National Income and Product Accounts, 1-2 – 1-3 (2015). 
152 See id. at 1-3; BEA, State Personal Income and Employment, supra note 150, at 1-8 (2015).  
153 See NIPA Handbook, supra note 151, at 2-6 – 2-13; NIPA tbl 2.1, Personal Income and 
its Disposition, available at: http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm.  
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income, such as bank depositor services and the interest and dividend income 
on insurance and pension accounts.154 The assets in owner-occupied housing, 
insurance companies, retirement funds, and bank deposits make up an 
enormous amount of personal wealth, so it follows that the income produced 
from those assets should be taken account of—though no other measure does. 
And not even NIPA Personal Income measures imputed household services, 
like parent-provided child care.  
The NIPA Personal Income concept also does not include capital gain 
income.155 This is not unreasonable, given that this income concept is based on 
the idea of national production. Production at the corporate level is counted 
separately, so including increases in the prices of corporate equity as “national 
production” would be partly double-counting. However, the Personal Income 
concept is not synonymous with full national production—it is only the 
measure of production done by individuals, and does not impute corporate 
earnings to individuals.156 Thus, capital income due to increases in the value of 
capital assets goes almost completely uncounted in the Personal Income 
measure. 
2. Census Bureau Money Income 
The Census Bureau, through the Current Population Survey, measures 
families’ “money income,” which, as the name implies, is intended as a 
measure of the resources that a family has available for consumption. It is a 
more bottom-up “micro” approach, compared to the “macro” approach of the 
BEA.157 It is also a significantly narrower definition, since it measures mostly 
cash and cash equivalents, and thus leaves out things that the BEA includes, 
such as employer contributions to health care, retirement insurance, and Social 
Security, in-kind government transfers, and imputed rent.158 (Though, unlike 
NIPA Personal Income, it includes private transfers, like gifts, alimony, and 
child support.) One study found the gap between Census Money Income and 
BEA Personal Income to be over $2 trillion in 2001.159 
                                                
154 See supra.  
155 See id. 
156 See NIPA Handbook, supra note 151, at 2-13.  
157 See Arnold J. Katz, Explaining Long-term Differences Between Census and BEA Measures of 
Household Income 9-10, BEA Working Paper (2012) (on file with author). 
158 See Bernadette D. Proctor, Jessica L. Semega, & Melissa A. Kollar, Income and Poverty in 
the United States: 2015 21 (2016). For a more thorough discussion, see Bureau of the Census, 
Money Income in the United States: 1997, Appendix A: Definitions and Explanations A-1 – 
A-4 (1998).  
159 Ruser et al., supra note 149, at 2 (BEA estimate of $8.678 trillion vs. CPS estimate of 
$6.446 trillion).  
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Recognizing the relative meagerness of the Money Income definition, the 
Census Bureau also uses 15 other “alternative” definitions of income for 
various purposes (underscoring how many definitions are possible). Definition 
15 is the broadest, including in-kind government transfers and realized gain, as 
well the employer’s contribution to retirement and the employee’s share of 
payroll taxes (presumably under the view that they are also income contributed 
to retirement savings).160 On the Census Bureau’s website, researchers can also 
construct their own definition of income out of 42 separately compiled 
components of income.161 
3. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey Income 
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (“CE”) is conducted by the BLS 
primarily for revisions to the CPI index of inflation,162 and it is thus especially 
focused on expenditures (as opposed to the BEA’s focus on production and 
the Census’s focus on money). The concept lines up closely to the Census’s 
Money Income definition, however (the Census Bureau performs both 
surveys). Differences include the inclusion of employer-provided non-cash 
fringe benefits in the Census definition but not the BLS definition. The BLS 
also only includes transfers from others if they are regular, as opposed to 
lump-sum, and does not deduct the employee’s share of payroll taxes.163 
Presumably these differences are driven by a desire to a get the most accurate 
picture of the income that flows into an individual’s purchases of consumer 
goods.  
4. Congressional Budget Office Before-Tax Income 
CBO is especially interested in measuring or estimating the distributional 
effects of tax and other legislative changes. For this purpose, they use three 
income measures: Market Income, Market Income after transfers but before 
taxes (what I am calling “Before-Tax Income”), and Market Income after taxes 
and transfers.164 I chose Before-Tax Income because it’s the broadest measure. 
It essentially takes AGI and corrects for certain tax expenditures, such as the 
                                                
160 See Bureau of the Census, supra note 158, at A-4; Alternative Measures of Income, 
https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/income/about/glossary/alternative-
measures.html.  
161 http://www.census.gov/cps/data/incdef.html 
162 See Consumer Expenditure Survey, http://www.bls.gov/cex.  
163 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey Glossary: Income, 
http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxgloss.htm; Consumer Expenditure Survey, tbl. 1203, Income 
before taxes, 2015, http://www.bls.gov/cex/2015/combined/income.pdf.  
164 See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 
1979 and 2007 33-34 (2011).  
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exclusion of interest on state and local bonds and the partial exclusion of some 
retirement and Social Security income.165 It also adds in cash and in-kind 
government transfers, like SNAP and Medicaid, but does not include transfers 
through the tax system, such as the EITC. It also aims to get a fuller picture of 
income by including the employer’s portion of the payroll tax and the 
proportionate share of corporate taxes borne by capital and labor.166 Both 
would be offset in the after-tax income measure, but including them in the 
pre-tax measure allows CBO to better understand the distributive 
consequences.  
5. Federal Reserve Bulletin Income 
The Federal Reserve publishes what it calls “Bulletin Income,” derived 
from its Survey of Consumer Finances. The Fed is particularly concerned with 
household balance sheets—stocks, rather than flows—and its income measure 
reflects that. For example, it includes a relatively broad definition of capital 
income, including capital gains (unlike the BEA, Census, and BLS measure). It 
also includes the value of private cash transfers, like alimony and child support, 
government cash transfers, and in-kind government transfers with respect to 
housing.167 (I suspect that including transfers for housing but not health care 
reflects the Fed’s focus on assets and liabilities.) However, because the SCF 
survey refers individuals to their tax returns to answer some of the questions 
about income, Bulletin Income also mirrors AGI in some odd ways, such as 
not including employer contributions for health care and retirement in labor 
income, including only taxable fringe benefits, and not including veterans’ 
payments. Finally, and uniquely among the income measures here, the SCF 
seems to allow for respondents to declare negative income, due to excessive 
losses. This is consistent with the Haig-Simons concept, and also with the 
Fed’s focus on household balance sheets, but “negative income” is a concept 
that some other agencies don’t consider. 
6. SNAP, SSI, FAFSA, ACA 
Finally, I consider the income measures used to determine eligibility for 
various government transfers. SNAP, often referred to as “food stamps,” 
provides cash assistance for low-income individuals in the purchase of food. 
SSI provides additional support under Social Security for disabled individuals. 
                                                
165 See id. at 33.  
166 Id.  
167 See Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Consumer Finances, Summary Listing of Questions 
Asked in the 2013 SCF, 21-22; Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Consumer Finances, Codebook 
for 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (especially questions under Code x5725), available at: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/files/codebk2013.txt,  
THE DEFINITIONS OF INCOME - DRAFT 
 47 
The Free Application for Federal Student Aid determines students’ eligibility 
for Pell Grants, subsidized federal loans, and other educational transfers. And 
the Modified Adjusted Gross Income measure determines the size of the 
premium support tax credits used to subsidize individuals’ purchase of health 
insurance through the Affordable Care Act exchanges.  
Each measure differs, in sometimes idiosyncratic ways. For example, the 
measure of income for purposes of SNAP appears to allow net losses from 
farming activity but not other net losses.168 (My instinct is that this is somehow 
valued by the farm lobby, but I’m at a loss to explain why.) SSI Countable 
Income does not appear to count capital gains, because that’s just a shift in the 
character of a resource, not an increase in resources.169 Because SSI (along with 
SNAP and FAFSA) looks not only at income but also resources, counting 
capital gains would presumably be a form of double-counting (though SNAP 
and FAFSA both include capital gains in income). SSI also explicitly focuses 
on the income and resources needed to procure food and shelter, and 
therefore counts in-kind transfers of food and shelter as income (since they 
offset the demands on cash for food and shelter).170 
A final, particularly important feature of these measures is FAFSA’s and 
the ACA’s reliance on AGI as the baseline measure. Both start with AGI and 
make certain adjustments. In the case of FAFSA, tax-expenditure-type items, 
such as tax-exempt interest, workers’ compensation, and veterans’ benefits are 
added back in.171 Modified Adjusted Gross Income for the ACA is just AGI 
plus untaxed foreign income, tax-exempt interest, and excluded Social Security 
benefits.172  
While this sample is too small to allow for firm conclusions, it is telling 
that two of the newer government transfer programs do not set out to create 
an income measure from scratch, but instead start with an existing measure—
AGI—and just make adjustments. If future government programs key benefits 
off of need rather than being universal—as seems likely173—then the tax 
measure of income may become even more prominent. More use of AGI 
could serve to further entrench the particular policy choices embedded within 
that definition. 
                                                
168 See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)(9). 
169 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103(c).  
170 See id. at § 416.1130(b) 
171 See 20 U.S.C. § 1087vv.  
172 See I.R.C.§ 36B(d)(2)(B).  
173 See John R. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, 104 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1072-78 (2016) 
(discussing budget constraints that drive governments to limit nominal expenditures just to 
subsidies and distributional adjustments rather than full provision).  
THE DEFINITIONS OF INCOME - DRAFT 
 48 
C. Income Studies: Piketty, Saez, Etc. 
To illustrate the importance of considering the different definitions of 
income and how they are used, I now look briefly at the trajectory of perhaps 
the most important work in income inequality in the last two decades, the 
work of Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and co-authors, as well as a 
competing line of literature from Jeff Larimore, Richard Burkhauser, and co-
authors. My purpose here is not to provide a definitive overview of their work 
or to take sides, but rather to show how research and conclusions can change 
significantly depending on income definitions, and also that researchers are 
beginning to grabble with the limits of tax-driven definitions of income. An 
important irony illustrated by this is that researchers are moving beyond tax-
driven definitions of income at the same time that policymakers are doubling 
down, especially through the ACA and FAFSA income concepts. 
In work that culminated in a 2003 paper (which continues to be updated 
online with more recent data),174 Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez tackled 
the issue of income inequality, and especially the growth in the very top shares 
of income. Their challenge was that survey data could not give them an 
answer, because of top-coding and a lack of oversampling. Their solution was 
to use tax data instead, following the method of Simon Kuznets (1953).175 
Using tax data from 1913 to 1998, they show that the share of income earned 
by the top income groups followed a U-shape over that period, with very high 
shares early and late in the period, but somewhat lower during World War II 
and the post-war period.176 Their finding that top income shares have been 
growing in recent decades has had a major effect on policy discussion around 
income inequality.  
While tax data can provide more reliable data on top income share groups, 
it is—as we well know by this point in the Article—an imperfect measure of 
income. It does not include several important categories of income, including 
employer-provided health care and other excluded fringe benefits, many 
government transfers (both cash and in-kind), and not all Social Security, all of 
which are important categories of income for lower- and middle-income 
taxpayers. Piketty and Saez also explicitly exclude capital gain income and tax-
exempt interest, both of which are important categories of income for high-
income taxpayers.177  
                                                
174 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 118 
Q.J. ECON. 1 (2003). 
175 Id. at 1-2. 
176 Id. at 11. 
177 See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income and Wage Inequality in the United States, 
1913-2002 in TOP INCOMES OVER THE 20TH CENTURY: A CONTRAST BETWEEN 
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A more subtle methodological issue arises from the fact that Piketty and 
Saez (2003) are trying to compute shares of income, not just levels of income. 
To do that, they need a denominator that reflects total national income. 
Ideally, they would use total income as reported on tax returns, to be 
consistent with their numerators, but this isn’t possible since prior to 1945 
only higher-income individuals paid the income tax and reported their 
incomes. Thus, the tax data doesn’t have a measure (even an imperfect one) of 
total income prior to 1945.178 Instead, they use NIPA Personal Income, the 
income concept discussed in Part VI.B.1, as Kuznets (1953) did.179 
However, the two concepts—the tax and NIPA measures—include 
different items, as discussed above and shown in Table 1. To address this 
mismatch, Kuznets (1953) makes a number of adjustments to national income 
in order to bring it closer to the tax measure of income.180 It’s not clear 
whether Piketty and Saez (2003) make the same adjustments, however. These 
adjustments should affect income shares, since the items included or excluded 
from one or the other measure affect individuals differently. For example, 
imputed rent from owner-occupied housing likely accrues more to higher 
income individuals. If imputed rent is in the numerator (since it’s included in 
the NIPA measure) but not the denominator, this would bias the top income 
shares downward. Other items, like disability and workers’ compensation 
payments probably cut the other way.  
If the differences between the tax and NIPA income measures were 
consistent over time, this might be less of a concern, at least for showing 
trends. However, the differences between the tax and NIPA measures of 
income is not static, but may be growing in recent years, with increasing 
amounts of income not in the tax base.181 Thus, some of the movement in 
income shares may reflect just these relative changes in the two income 
measures, rather than changes in actual income inequality. 
This is not to challenge the overall thrust of the work, and it is unlikely 
that these issues would affect the direction of the trend that they show. But 
they could have a material effect on the levels and the rate of change. For 
                                                                                                                       
CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN AND ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES 198 n.70 (A.B. Atkinson 
and T. Piketty, eds., 2007). 
178 See Piketty & Saez, supra note 174 at 4 (discussing the problem).  
179 Id. at 6 n.9. See SIMON KUZNETS, SHARES OF UPPER INCOME GROUPS IN INCOME AND 
SAVINGS (1953). 
180 See id. at 5. 
181 See Jess Bricker, Alice M. Henriques, Jake A. Krimmel & John E. Sabelhaus, Measuring 
Income and Wealth at the Top Using Administrative and Survey Data, Federal Reserve Board Finance 
and Economics Discussion Series Working Paper 2015-30, at 10 (2015); Thomas Piketty, 
Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the 
United States, NBER Working Paper No. 22945, at 42 fig. 1 (2016). 
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example, Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon (2012) show that using different 
measures of income can increase the growth rate in middle class incomes.182 
Specifically, they include the value of post-tax transfers (cash and some in-
kind), and also adjust for household size. They also use the same income 
concept for both the numerator and the denominator—CPS Money Income—
avoiding the problem Piketty and Saez (2003) faced. But this reintroduces 
other problems, like the top-coding of top incomes and the absence of some 
important items of income from the CPS concept.183 The CPS also does not 
include data on tax credits, tax liabilities, or the value of in-kind benefits, 
which Burkhauser, Larrimore & Simon (2012) instead impute using tax data.184 
Based on a recently-posted working paper, Piketty and Saez seem to 
consider the income definition question to be of first-order importance. 
Piketty, Saez & Zucman (2016) points out that previous studies like their own 
don’t capture the full picture of “national income,” since they look only at tax 
data; fail to take account of taxes, transfers, and spending on public goods; 
and, by looking at tax units rather than individuals, don’t capture the profound 
changes in female labor force participation over time.185 In the new paper, they 
instead look at the distribution of national income—i.e., total production—
with some adjustments, such as imputing corporate retained earnings to 
individuals in proportion to their observed dividend and realized capital gain 
income.186 They also make some substantial (and disputable) assumptions 
about the incidence of both taxes and public goods expenditures.187 
They find a similar U-shaped trend in the top income shares as Piketty & 
Saez (2003) but with somewhat less concentration of pre-tax income at the top 
10%, though still high and sharply rising in recent years.188 Expanding the 
definition of income appears to have had a more significant effect on top-10% 
incomes in years before 1986, increasing the share of income earned by the top 
10% by the more than ten percentage points in some years.189 They attribute 
this to high levels of undistributed corporate retained earnings in earlier 
periods, and also to the growth in capital income earned by pension funds in 
later periods.190 Moreover, the share of the bottom 90% is increasingly made 
                                                
182 Richard V. Burkhauser, Jeff Larrimore & Kosali I. Simon, A “Second Opinion” on the 
Economic Health of the American Middle Class, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 7, 10-11 (2012). 
183 See supra Part VI.B.2. 
184 Burkhauser et al., supra note 182 at 11.  
185 Piketty et al., supra note 181, at 1.  
186 See id. at 12.  
187 See id. at 13-16. 
188 Id. at 30-31 & fig. 12.  
189 Id. 
190 The income earned by pension funds is distributed more equally than corporate 
retained earnings, and so it does not increase inequality as much. See id. at 31. 
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up of tax-exempt income, such as fringe benefits. They find that tax-exempt 
labor income made up 13% of bottom-90% income in 1962, but 23% of 
bottom-90% income today.191  
At the same time that Piketty and Saez have addressed weaknesses in the 
tax definition of income by using survey data, Larrimore, Burkhauser, Auten & 
Armour (2016) moves in the other direction, using tax data in combination 
with survey data (in contrast to the 2012 paper that uses only CPS data).192 
They also go beyond the Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2016) approach to 
consider accrued capital gains from both housing and corporate stock.193 With 
this and other differences, they also find that the top 1% share of income has 
increased in recent years, though less dramatically than Piketty & Saez (2003). 
In the end, however, the two papers end up in a similar spot, though swapping 
places. Piketty, Saez & Zucman (2016) find that the top-1% share of post-tax 
national income (their broadest measure that includes the effects of taxes and 
transfers) in 2014 is 15.6%, with Larrimore, Burkhauser, Auten & Armour 
(2016) finding that the top-1% share of “comprehensive income” in 2013 is 
18.6%. While both are slightly lower than the estimates in Piketty & Saez 
(2003), they are still substantial and growing.  
What we can take from these papers (in addition to their actual 
conclusions), is that a tax definition of income, and the data on income 
collected by the IRS, is hugely valuable to researchers and sometimes can 
provide a decent, though imperfect, snapshot of relative economic positions 
and trends. But the tax data can only go so far, and the forms of income that it 
misses—especially unrealized capital gains, fringe benefits, and income from 
owner-occupied housing—are significant and have material effects on both 
levels of income and degrees of inequality. Researchers are increasingly aware 
of the first-order importance of these differences, and hopefully Congress and 
other policymakers will follow suit.  
                                                
191 Id. at 33.  
192 See Jeff Larrimore, Richard V. Burkhauser, Gerald Auten & Philip Armour, Recent 
Trends in U.S. Top Income Shares in Tax Record Data Using More Comprehensive Measures of Income 
Including Accrued Capital Gains, at 1-2,  NBER Working Paper No. 23007 (2016). 
193 Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2016) calculate capital gain by attributing current-year 
corporate earnings to individuals in proportion to their realized dividend and capital gain 
income. Piketty et al., supra note 181, at 12-13. As Larrimore et al. (2016) point out, this fails to 
capture increase in stock prices based on investor perceptions of future corporate earnings. 
Larrimore et al., supra note 192, at 6.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that income is not capable of a single, pure, and 
rigorous definition, and that any income definition instead must be 
constructed based on the underlying goals or purposes of the relevant policy 
or study. Different parties will include or exclude different items based on 
particular policy goals or issues under study, and with good reason. This 
understanding can help us to better contextualize some debates in the 
literature, such as the role of tax expenditure analysis and optimal income tax 
theory. The mutability of income can also be demonstrated by the multitude of 
definitions that different government agencies use for different purposes.  
This matters for a couple of reasons. First, the concept of “income” carries 
great weight. It is our index of equality, and the basis that we use for taxes, 
transfers, distributive analysis, and broader normative comparisons. But we 
can only study what we measure, so the choice of what is “income” and what 
is not has important effects on those same dimensions. 
But, second, knowing that income is a constructed concept allows us to 
better answer the question “What is income?” Ultimately, income is whatever 
we want it to be. It is simply the name that we use to describe the set of things 
that we measure for purposes of making normative comparisons. Whether an 
item is or is not in the Haig-Simons or some other comprehensive definition is 
beside the point. Maybe we care that the Flügeladjutant gets free carriage rides, 
maybe we don’t, but in no way is a tax, or other, agency obligated to include 
them in income just because some particular definition might. What a tax 
agency, and Congress, is obligated to do is ensure that the items included in 
the income definition for tax purposes are those items that it believes are 
appropriate in assigning relative tax burdens.  
Pushing against this view, however, is the importance of the tax definition 
of income in non-tax policy areas. The ubiquity of taxation, the detail of the 
Tax Code, the centrality of income measurement to the IRS’s mission, and the 
enormous amount of data the IRS collects makes reliance on tax definitions of 
income tempting to policymakers and researchers. But if AGI is just one 
possible measure of income, and one inherently imbued with tax policy 
choices (some reasonable, some not), then policymakers and researchers must 
be very careful and deliberate in using it. As described herein, researchers are 
coming to grips with these issues just as policymakers may be relying even 
more heavily on AGI.  
The enormous simplification and administrative benefits that come from 
using AGI mean that Congress and other agencies will likely continue to rely 
on AGI to some degree. If so, they should also be sensitive to non-tax issues 
when considering changes to the tax base, despite the claim above that the 
government may assign tax burdens however it wishes. This is not because 
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they ought to follow some particular definition of income—indeed, because 
income definitions follow in part from policy goals, it is rather because there 
are now multiple policies, and therefore multiple definitions of income, in play, 
and AGI is asked to fill them all. It may be asking too much of Congress for it 
to consider the effects of AGI changes on, e.g., Pell Grant eligibility or the 
Fed’s Survey of Consumer Finances, but AGI affects those and more. Our 
definitions of income overlap and intertwine in important, often unseen ways, 
hopefully made somewhat less opaque by this Article.  
Table:	Income	Defintions
ITEM	OF	INCOME AGI BEA	Personal	Income CPS	Money	Income CPS	Alternative	15 BLS	CE	Survey CBO	Before-Tax	Income
Labor	Income
Wages Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fringe	benefits	(other	than	health	care) Some Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Employer	health	care	contributions No Yes No Yes No Yes
Employer	retirement	contributions No Yes No No No Yes
Employer	contributions	to	SS No No	(added,	then	deducted) No No No Yes
Household	production/imputed	services No Some	(farm) No No No No
Capital	Income
Rent	&	royalties	from	property Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes	(incl.	share	of	corp	taxes)
Taxable	interest	and	dividends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax-exempt	interest No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Net	business	income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Imputed	investment	income	(e.g.,	on	pension	funds,	insurance	funds,	bank	depositor	services)No Yes No No No No
Realized	gain Yes No No Yes No Yes
Unrealized	gain No No No No No No
Imputed	rent No Yes No Yes No No
Retirement	income
Retirement	income Some No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Social	Security	payments Some Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income	Security
Workers'	compensation No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment	ins.	payments Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SSI No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disability	&	survivor	payments	(non-SSI) Some No Yes Yes No ?
Veterans'	payments	(other	than	educational) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transfers
Private	cash	transfers/gifts/transfers	from	non-profits No Transfers	to	nonprofits	incl. Yes Yes Regular,	not	lump-sum No?
Alimony Yes No Yes Yes Yes No?
Child	support No No Yes Yes Yes No?
Cash	government	transfers	(other	than	EITC)	(incl.	SNAP	and	other	income	maintence	programs)Some Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EITC No Yes No Yes No No
In-kind	government	transfers No Yes No Yes No Yes
Educational	assistance	(other	than	as	compensation) No Yes Yes Yes Some No?
Items	of	Expense/Deduction	(i.e.,	is	income	lowered	by	these	amounts?)
Employee	contrbutions	to	SS No Yes Yes No No No
Negative	income	(net	loss) No Yes ? ? ? ?
Tax	payments No No No Yes No No
Employee	retirement	contributions Some No No No No No
Table:	Income	Defintions
ITEM	OF	INCOME
Labor	Income
Wages
Fringe	benefits	(other	than	health	care)
Employer	health	care	contributions
Employer	retirement	contributions
Employer	contributions	to	SS
Household	production/imputed	services
Capital	Income
Rent	&	royalties	from	property
Taxable	interest	and	dividends
Tax-exempt	interest
Net	business	income
Imputed	investment	income	(e.g.,	on	pension	funds,	insurance	funds,	bank	depositor	services)
Realized	gain
Unrealized	gain
Imputed	rent
Retirement	income
Retirement	income
Social	Security	payments
Income	Security
Workers'	compensation
Unemployment	ins.	payments
SSI
Disability	&	survivor	payments	(non-SSI)
Veterans'	payments	(other	than	educational)
Transfers
Private	cash	transfers/gifts/transfers	from	non-profits
Alimony
Child	support
Cash	government	transfers	(other	than	EITC)	(incl.	SNAP	and	other	income	maintence	programs)
EITC
In-kind	government	transfers
Educational	assistance	(other	than	as	compensation)
Items	of	Expense/Deduction	(i.e.,	is	income	lowered	by	these	amounts?)
Employee	contrbutions	to	SS
Negative	income	(net	loss)
Tax	payments
Employee	retirement	contributions
Fed	SCF	"Bulletin"	Income SNAP	Gross	Income SSI	Countable	Income FAFSA	"Total	Income" ACA	MAGI
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Taxable	only No No Some Some
No No No No No
No No No Some No
No No No No No
No No No No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No No No No
Yes Yes No Yes Yes
No No No No No
No No No No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes Some
Yes Yes Yes Some Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes N/A No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes Some
No Yes Yes Yes No
Yes If	exceed	$1200 Yes Yes No
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Yes Other	than	SNAP Some No Some
No No No No No
Housing No Food	and	shelter No No
Some	grants No No No No
No No No No No
Yes Some	(farming	losses)? No No
No No No No No
No No? No No Some
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